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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of ramping rate restrictions at hydro
power plants. The first essay examines the impact of ramping rate restrictions imposed
on hydro operations to protect aquatic ecosystems. A dynamic optimization model of the
profit maximizing decisions of a hydro operator is solved for various restrictions on water
flow, using data for a representative hydro operation in Ontario. Profits are negatively
affected, but for a range of restrictions the impact is not large. Ramping restrictions cause
a redistribution of hydro production over a given day, which can result in an increase
in total hydro power produced. This affects the need for power from other sources with
consequent environmental impacts.
The second essay uses a real options approach to study the impact of ramping rate
restrictions on hydro power plants. We consider the effect on profits from electricity gen-
eration in order to inform policy decisions about ramping rate restrictions. A novelty of
the essay is in examining the optimal operation of a prototype hydro power plant with
electricity prices modelled as a regime switching process. We show that profits are nega-
tively affected by ramping restrictions. Interestingly for a large range of restrictions, profit
is not sensitive to ramping restrictions. The results point to the importance of accurately
modelling electricity prices in gauging the trade offs involved in imposing restrictions on
hydro operators which may hinder their ability to respond to volatile electricity prices and
meet peak demands.
The third essay investigates the impact of ramping rate restrictions on hydro power
plants using a three regimes model with multiple jump sizes. We consider how the multiple
jump sizes among these three regimes affect the impact of ramping restrictions on the
prototype hydro power plant. The numerical experiments provide further evidence that
ramping restrictions have a larger impact when the expected variation in price is increased
such as through an increase in the jump size which makes it desirable to change water
release rates relatively frequently.
In both non-stochastic and stochastic settings, these three essays have highly consistent
results on the impact of ramping restrictions on the hydro station’s profit. We observe
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profits are significantly affected (by less than 7% in essay one, by less than 10% in essay
two, and by less than 9% in essay three) in the case of the most severe ramping constraints,
but we also observe a range of less severe ramping restrictions over which profits are not
substantially affected (by less than 2% in essay one, by less than 3% in essay two, and by
less than 2% in essay three). Results from this thesis should facilitate the implementation
of ramping rate restrictions for environmental and economic benefits.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Hydro power is currently favored as a source of clean energy with several desirable features
including no carbon emissions, low operating costs, the ability to meet peak demands,
significant operational flexibilities and high reliability. In an era of deregulated electricity
markets, global climate change and volatile prices for fossil fuels, these key features of
hydro power become extremely valuable. However, many studies show that hydroelectric
production can also have significant negative effects on the environment including impacts
on the aquatic ecosystem due to changes in in-stream flow rates, reservoir levels, and water
temperatures which cause changes in the chemical and physical composition of the released
water. In addition flow fluctuations can impact beaches and cause bank erosion affecting
shore areas that provide critical wildlife habitat for native fishes and other aquatic flora
and fauna (Edwards et al. [1999]).
There are numerous studies in the biological and environmental sciences literature ex-
ploring these negative consequences of hydro operations. There is a consensus that modified
water flows are affecting fish and fish habitat, but the response varies widely. The extent
of these negative environmental impacts is case specific, depending on the size of hydro
operation and the fragility of the surrounding ecosystem including the characteristics of
the water body that receives the released water. Examples of studies documenting these
effects include Murchie et al. [2008] and Marty et al. [2009]. Niu and Insley [2013] reference
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numerous other studies which examine the environmental consequences of altered water
flows caused by hydro operations. The consequences for the surrounding ecosystem may
be judged to be serious enough to warrant restrictions on the management of water flows
by a hydro operator. This is an issue that has received attention in numerous jurisdictions
across North America. Currently, in Ontario both electricity producers and the Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources are interested in testing whether restricting ramping rates
through turbines at hydroelectric facilities can provide ecological benefits without unduly
affecting hydro production (Smokorowski et al. [2009]). Some examples of hydro dams
that operate with ramping constraints include the Glen Canyon Dams in Arizona (Veselka
et al. [1995] and Harpman [1999]); the Sugar Lake Dam in British Columbia (BC Hydro
[2005]); and the Kerr Dam in Montana (Flathead Lakers [2005]).
Hydro operators seeking to maximize profits face a complex dynamic optimization
problem. The production of electricity depends in a non-linear fashion on the speed of
water released through turbines as well as on the reservoir head, which refers to the height
of the water in the reservoir. Releasing water at any given hour reduces the head and
hence negatively affects the amount of power that can be produced in the next hour.
Eventually the released water will be recovered through water inflow into the reservoir.
Maximizing profits over time is thus a balancing act between water inflow to and outflow
from the reservoir while attempting to match changing electricity demands over time. In
additions, hydro power stations are typically required to meet operational, physical and
legal requirements. With no restrictions, hydroelectric facilities will maximize profits by
adjusting water flows so that electricity production is highest when it is most profitable.
This implies hydropower stations will tend to increase the rate of water flow (or ramp up)
when prices/demands are high and decrease the rate of water flow (or ramp down) when
prices/demands are low to let water levels in the dam recover. Any restrictions imposed on
water flows reduce efficiency, profitability, and the ability to react to changes in electricity
demand and price.
Ramping rate restrictions are believed to provide environmental benefits by protecting
downstream fish, fish habitat and the productive capacity of the river. However, to the
extent that hydro production is affected, there will also likely be offsetting impacts on other
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sources of electric power generation such as thermal generation from coal, oil or natural gas.
This would have added environmental consequences since thermal power is associated with
emissions of greenhouse gases, and pollutants such as SO2 and NO2. Hence in evaluating
ramping rate restrictions it is important to study the trade offs between protecting aquatic
ecosystems and the optimal operation of hydropower plants to satisfy electricity demand.
In much of the existing research on electric power scheduling, ramping rate restrictions are
regarded as physical/technical constraints in optimization models,1 rather than legal/policy
constraints. There are currently only a limited number of studies that estimate the extra
costs and associated benefits of restricting ramping at hydroelectric generating stations.
In this thesis, we examine the effect of ramping rate restrictions imposed by a regulatory
authority on a power plant’s operation and profit. Using a model of a prototype hydro plant
we examine the tradeoff between the desire for stricter control of water flows to protect the
aquatic environment and the need to vary water flow in response to changing electricity
demand and price. We also consider the impact of ramping restrictions on the need for
alternate sources of power which may also have undesirable environmental consequences.
This thesis will contribute to our understanding of the economic issues involved in imposing
ramping restrictions on hydro electric facilities.
In the second chapter, we examine the impact of flow regulations on optimal hydro
operations and profitability. We solve a dynamic non-linear model of the profit maximizing
decision by a private hydro operator given restrictions on flow rates imposed by a regulator.
We assume the hydro plant must meet a minimum level of contract electricity demand and
if unable to do so through hydro production, must buy on the spot market. Using data
that are representative of a medium-sized hydro operation in Ontario, we investigate the
operator’s optimal decisions regarding hydro production and power purchases in on-peak
and off-peak periods and examine the sensitivity of profits to ramping rate restrictions.
We abstract from the issue of electricity price uncertainty by assuming on- and off-peak
prices are known and constant.
In principle, the optimal ramping rate restrictions can be identified through a cost
1Thermal units, especially large and efficient units, frequently have the most significant ramp limits in
the system (Svoboda et al. [1997]). In this thesis, we only consider the ramping issue for hydro units.
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benefit analysis which includes the lost profit for the hydro operator, the environmental
impact of changed reliance on thermal power, and the environmental benefit for the river
ecosystem. We assume that any change in hydro production implies an equal offsetting
change in thermal electric generation - either coal or natural gas. We estimate the envi-
ronmental cost or benefit of this change in thermal production due to the resulting change
in air pollution emissions. Currently, there are no studies available to measure the en-
vironmental benefit of ramping restrictions for the river ecosystem in terms of monetary
values. However we undertake to estimate the other two impacts to provide a lower bound
for the environmental benefit of ramping rate restrictions that would be required in order
for them to be worthwhile. This chapter has identified some of the important trade offs
which include the impact on hydro operator profits as well as the environmental impact
of a change in the intensity of use of other types of power. However, these results are
obtained under relatively restrictive assumptions. For example, the optimization model is
solved in a deterministic framework. Uncertain electricity prices as well as water inflows
imply that optimal hydro power operation is best studied in a stochastic framework.
In the third chapter, we investigate the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant
operations and profitability using a Markov regime switching model of electricity prices.
Hydro operations are modelled as a stochastic control problem subject to various physical
and environmental constraints. Under the risk adjusted measure, we use the standard
hedging approach in options pricing to derive the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Partial Differ-
ential Equation (HJB-PDE) for the value of the hydro power station. The optimal ramping
rate for water releases is obtained by maximizing the value of the hydro plant. The opti-
mal control is determined by solving the HJB-PDE numerically using a fully implicit finite
difference approach with semi-Lagrangian time stepping. Using the same prototype hydro
plant as chapter 2, we examine the impact of a range of ramping restrictions on hydro
plant operations and profitability. We focus on how the impact of ramping restrictions
depends on the characteristics of the assumed price process such as the volatility, proba-
bility of regime shift, speed of mean reversion, and long run average price and relies on the
cost of generating hydroelectric power (relative to the price level). For comparison we also
examine results for a single price regime case to determine how the presence of two price
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regimes affects hydro plant value and optimal operations. Given the problematic nature
of estimating the environmental benefits or costs of different ramping rate restrictions, we
seek instead to examine the other side of the equation - the costs of these restrictions in
terms of lost profitability. Knowledge of these costs will help illuminate the trade offs
involved and inform the design of regulations.
In the fourth chapter, we make a further investigation on the impact of ramping re-
strictions by extending the Markov regime switching model in chapter 3 to a model with
multiple jump sizes. In the empirical analysis, we conduct numerical experiments on the
jump sizes by proposing a regime switching model with three regimes: the base regime, the
first spike regime, and the second spike regime. Assuming different jump sizes among these
three regimes allows us to study the effect of multiple jump sizes on the impact of ramping
restrictions on the hydro plant. The different jump sizes among these three regimes could
be viewed as the simplest approximation of the random jump size observed from the data.
The main contribution of the thesis is in providing a comprehensive analysis of the eco-
nomics of ramping rate restrictions of hydro power plants for the purpose of environmental
protection. In both deterministic and stochastic settings, the thesis provides insights into
our understanding of ramping related issues for a hydro power station, including the op-
timal choice of ramping restrictions and possible policy recommendations. This thesis
extents the existing literature as follows:
• The empirical studies in this thesis are based on a unique data set for a prototype
hydro power plant in Ontario.
• Chapter 2’s contribution to the existing literature is in furthering our understand-
ing of the trade offs involved when ramping rate restrictions are imposed at hydro
facilities. In particular, we examine the sensitivity of hydro station profits to ramp-
ing restrictions as well as the potential impact on hydro electricity production and
production from alternative generating facilities.
• Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by using a replacement power approach (as-
suming that any change in hydro production implies an equal offsetting change in
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thermal electric generation) to measure the net cost of ramping rate restrictions (as
the loss in profit from hydro generation net of the value of any implied change in
polluting emissions from thermal plants). This net cost for the prototype hydro plant
may be viewed as the lower bound needed for the value of aquatic ecosystem benefits
of ramping restrictions for these restrictions to be worthwhile.
• Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by studying the impact of ramping restrictions
on hydro plant operations and profitability using a regime switching model of elec-
tricity prices, which we argue provides a more realistic characterization of electricity
prices than other models, such as jump diffusion, used previously in the literature.
• Chapter 3’s contribution to the literature is in furthering our understanding of how
the impact of ramping restrictions depends on the cost of generating hydroelectric
power and the characteristics of the assumed price process such as the volatility,
probability of regime shift, speed of mean reversion and long run average price, and
how the presence of two price regimes affects hydro plant value and optimal operations
and the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant.
• Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by empirically investigating the impact of
ramping rate restrictions on hydro plant operations and profitability using a regime
switching model with multiple jump sizes.
The main results of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
• In chapters 2, 3, and 4, for our medium-sized power plant we observe profits are sig-
nificantly affected for the most restrictive ramping constraints, but we also observe
a range of less severe ramping restrictions over which profits are not substantially
affected. This suggests that for some levels of ramping restrictions, the aquatic envi-
ronment can be properly protected while allowing hydro dams to maintain profitable
operations.
• In the second chapter, we find that ramping restrictions negatively affect profits to the
extent that they force a hydro operator to make different choices (on hydro production
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and power purchases) than when no ramping restrictions are imposed. One counter
intuitive result is that ramping restrictions can cause an increase in the total amount
of hydro power produced over a 24 hour period. Assuming that any change in hydro
production implies an equal offsetting change in thermal electric generation, the
increased hydro production constitutes an added environmental benefit of ramping
restrictions from reduced air pollution emissions, in addition to any benefits to the
aquatic ecosystem below the hydro dam.
• In the third chapter, we observe that in most scenarios the optimal control is of a
“bang-bang” type (ramping up or down at the upper limit). The exception to this is
when the dam is up against one of the other constraints such as maximum/minimum
release rates or maximum water content in the dam. We find that ramping restrictions
have a larger effect in an environment where frequent ramping up or down is desired.
A lower speed of mean reversion, higher volatility and more frequent transition to
the spike regime all have the effect of increasing the impact of ramping restrictions.
The results also show that price spikes have a significant effect on the value of the
hydro power plant, however the ramping effect on profits mostly depends on the level
of the price relative to the cost of generation (how long and how frequent the price
is close to or below the cost), but is not very sensitive to the price jumps.
• In the fourth chapter, our numerical experiments provide further evidence that ramp-
ing restrictions have a larger impact when the expected variation in price is increased
such as through an increase in jump size (for the third regime) which makes it desir-
able to change water release rates relatively frequently.
Results from this research should facilitate the implementation of environmental reg-
ulations designed to promote the integrity of river systems, as well as to provide a set of
planning tools regulators and industry can use to negotiate the optimal ramping rate for
environmental and economic benefits.
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Chapter 2
On the Economics of Ramping Rate
Restrictions at Hydro Power Plants:
Balancing Profitability and
Environmental Costs
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the effect of ramping rate restrictions imposed by a regulatory
authority on a power plant’s operation and profit. We model profit maximization of a
prototype hydro plant, based on a medium size plant in Ontario. Assuming that the
plant must satisfy a minimum contract demand either through producing hydro power
or purchasing power on the spot market, we investigate the operator’s optimal decisions
regarding hydro production and power purchases in on-peak and off-peak periods. We
abstract from the issue of electricity price uncertainty by assuming on- and off-peak prices
are known and constant1.
1In this chapter, the profit maximization model is kept fully deterministic because it allows us to include
extra control variables and restrictions to implement the replacement power approach. This determinis-
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We also consider the potential impact of ramping restrictions on the need for other
sources of power generation. We assume that any change in hydro production implies
an equal offsetting change in thermal electric generation - either coal or natural gas. We
estimate the environmental cost or benefit of this change in thermal production due to the
resulting change in air pollution emissions.
There are currently no suitable monetary measures available in the literature of the
environmental benefit for the river ecosystem of ramping restrictions. In the absence of
such monetary measures, we determine the net cost of ramping restrictions as the loss in
profit from hydro generation net of the value of any implied change in polluting emissions
from thermal plants. This net cost for the prototype hydro plant may be viewed as the
lower bound needed for the value of aquatic ecosystem benefits of ramping restrictions for
these restrictions to be worthwhile.
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is in furthering our understanding of the
trade offs involved when ramping rate restrictions are imposed at hydro facilities. In par-
ticular, we examine the sensitivity of hydro station profits to ramping restrictions as well as
the potential impact on electricity production from hydro and other sources. Although the
impact of ramping restrictions on firm profits will depend on the specifics of the particular
hydro plant under consideration, as well as the market structure that the plant operates in,
we are able to draw some general conclusions. Ramping restrictions will have a negative
effect on profits to the extent that they force a hydro operator to make different choices
than when no ramping restrictions are imposed. The most obvious choice variable affected
is the allocation of power sales over a given day. Profits are reduced if ramping restrictions
force hydro operators to increase the amount of power sold in off-peak periods when prices
are lower. In our analysis we observe a significant effect on profits for the most restrictive
ramping constraints, but we also observe a range of ramping restrictions over which profits
are not substantially affected.
A more surprising result is that ramping restrictions can cause an increase in the total
tic model is clearly limited since it ignores the stochastic nature of electricity prices and water inflows.
However, in a dynamic optimization model with stochastic electricity prices and water inflows, it would
be notoriously difficult to conduct the replacement power analysis.
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amount of hydro power produced over a 24 hour period. This is a consequence of hydro
operators’ efforts to maintain profits in the face of constraints. In response to the ramping
constraints, operators increase power production in off-peak periods while at the same
time attempting to maintain production as much as possible in on-peak periods. If the
increased hydro production implies a reduction in power produced by fossil fuel fired plants,
this may constitute an added environmental benefit of ramping restrictions, in addition to
any benefits to the aquatic ecosystem below the hydro dam.
It is important to note, however, that the analysis in this chapter is for a single hy-
dro plant. If ramping rate restrictions were applied to a significant portion of the hydro
generation capacity in the a particular province or state, then the impact on the entire
grid would need to be considered. In this chapter we assume that even though ramping
restrictions constrain the system’s ability to meet peak demand with hydro, it is possible
to meet those peak demands with other electricity sources at little increase in cost. A full
analysis of ramping restrictions on a significant portion of hydro generation would need to
consider the potential for increased cost in meeting peak demands by operating thermal
units less efficiently, or by adding more expensive gas-fired units.
This chapter is organized as follows: in the second section, we provide a brief review of
the related literature; assumptions and model formulation are presented in section three;
then we formally specify the optimization problem; data issues are addressed in section
five; next we calibrate the power generation function and the head function2; section seven
contains the empirical analysis of the hydro plant operation and profit; the environmental
impact of changes in thermal generations is considered in section eight; lastly, conclusions
and directions of future research are given in section nine.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on hydro dam operations and the associated environmental effects is enor-
mous. The existing research in this area can be divided into three broad categories: the
2The head refers to the difference in height between a dam’s water source and water outflow.
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power and civil engineering literature; the biology and environmental studies literature;
the energy and environmental economics literature. In this section we survey a selection
of papers from each of these literatures with an emphasis on ramping related issues.
In the power engineering literature, there has been considerable interest in the appli-
cation of mathematical programming methods to scheduling the generation of electricity.
Most of this work has focused on problems of scheduling the generation of hydro-electricity
or thermal electricity, and coordinating thermal electricity generation with hydro-electricity
generation. Much of the interest in electricity scheduling models concentrates on the op-
timal operation of power stations with the objective of producing electric power at the
lowest cost, at maximum profit, at the best efficiency, at maximum potential energy and
so on. In general, these models include many detailed technical specifications and con-
straints are quite complex. Their solution is computationally intensive, requiring special
solution algorithms.3 From the power engineering literature, some of the papers studying
the optimal production scheduling problem for a hydro-electric power producer include:
Hreinsson [1988], Soliman and Christensen [1988], Shawwash et al. [2000], Conejo et al.
[2002] and Deng et al. [2006].
In practice, hydro operators face regulatory requirements for minimum and maximum
water flows and levels, as well as restrictions on ramping rates which are intended to
protect the aquatic environment of the associated rivers and lakes. Some of the studies
discussed above include only minimum flow restrictions in their optimization models as
physical or environmental constraints. A few of them consider ramping rate restrictions
as physical constraints. In the international literature on power engineering, including
the papers mentioned above, relatively little attention has been paid to directly address
ramping rate restrictions as policy constraints for environmental protection. One exception
is Guan et al. [1999], where an optimization-based algorithm is presented for scheduling
hydro power systems with restricted operating zones and discharge ramping constraints.
In the Guan paper the ramping constraints may be imposed on discharges for generation or
spillage through canals or tunnels due to the requirements of navigation, the environment,
recreation, etc. They find that, with ramping constraints imposed, the hydro production
3See Bensalem et al. [2007] for example.
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schedule changes significantly and the costs are generally increased, since the constraints
limit the water release so that downstream power plants may generate less power.
The term ‘hydropeaking’ is used in the literature to refer to the shifting of hydro
production to periods in the day when prices are highest. The environmental effects of
hydropeaking power generation on fish and fish habitat have attracted much attention from
biological and environmental scientists. Most of their studies directly address the effect of
the instream flow rate (the minimum flow rate, the variation of flow rate and the ramping
rates) of regulated rivers on the downstream biological habitat. In Scruton et al. [2003],
hydropeaking or pulse power generation is defined as “reservoir operations, where water
is stored to generate electricity during times of peak demand, leading to diurnally and
annually variable water pulses in the river below the power station resulting in unnatural
flow patterns involving alterations to magnitude, duration, sequence, and frequency of
flows.” They note that hydropeaking often results in “rapid changes in river discharge and
associated habitat conditions over very short time scales (less than a day, or multiple peaks
per day) and changes can be moderate or as large as several orders of magnitude.” There
is a clear consensus that modified flow regimes in regulated rivers mainly for purposes of
hydroelectric generation are affecting fish and fish habitat, but the severity and direction
of the response varies widely. Murchie et al. [2008] conduct a systematic review of available
literature examining the response of fish to fluctuating flow regimes in different systems.
In regulated rivers, the environmental heterogeneity of fish habitat may be aggravated
and unpredictable, depending on hydropower demand and price. One consequence expe-
rienced in many rivers is peaking flow on a daily basis, with suddenly increasing and high
flows in the morning and increasingly higher flows during the day, then decreasing flow in
the evening, and extremely low flow at night. Hvidsten [1985], Cross and DosSantos [1988],
Bradford et al. [1995] and Saltveit et al. [2001] demonstrate that this variable flow pattern
affects the habitat conditions and directly results in stranding of young fish and increased
mortality. The negative impacts of hydropeaking are also documented by Flodmark et al.
[2002], Berland et al. [2004], Scruton et al. [2003], Scruton et al. [2005], Scruton et al.
[2008] and Grand et al. [2006]. Freeman et al. [2001] demonstrate that providing periods
of stable flow conditions below hydropower facilities during appropriate seasons should
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facilitate reproduction by native riverine fishes. Marty et al. [2009] find that there is a
significant effect of a high ramping rate flow regime on the length of the food web. The
operations of waterpower facilities will alter a river’s flow in terms of its magnitude, timing,
frequency, rate of change, and duration. A publication of the Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources [2003] summarizes some negative effects of this alteration, both from up-ramping
and down-ramping. Specifically this report states that excessive up-ramping could affect
fish holding instream and result in scouring of substrate and infauna (Cushman [1985]),
while slower down-ramping is beneficial for biota by protecting fauna from stranding and
ensuring better conditions for vegetation seeding (Petts and Maddock [1994]).
Relationships between the quantity of suitable fish habitat and flow have been used to
select regulatory minimum flows for numerous rivers (Jager and Smith [2008]). Currently,
there is considerable interest in Ontario in using and evaluating instream-flow-needs (IFN)
methods for fish. Kilgour et al. [2005] provide a review of IFN methods appropriate to
waterpower facilities. Gouraud et al. [2008] estimate the change in brown trout population
under different minimum instream flows. Murchie et al. [2008] suggest that more studies
are needed to evaluate the behaviour of fish during dynamic periods such as flow increase
or decrease (i.e. during the ramping). Jager and Smith [2008] review research on reservoir
optimization problems that explicitly includes environmental objectives. They find that
nearly half of the studies they reviewed addressed environmental flows by including a
constraint on minimum flow releases.
From our survey of the available information it appears that many hydro dams operate
with minimum flow requirements, but very few operate under ramping rate constraints.
Some examples that do face ramping constraints include the Glen Canyon Dams, located
on the Colorado River in Arizona, which are operated under restrictions on maximum
flows, minimum flows, ramp rates, and the daily change in flow (Veselka et al. [1995] and
Harpman [1999]). Located on the Shuswap River, east of Vernon in the southern interior
of British Columbia, the Sugar Lake Dam is operated under ramp rate constraints and
the Wilsey Dam needs to meet the minimum discharge requirement (BC Hydro [2005]).
The Kerr Dam on the Flathead River about five miles southwest of Polson in Montana
faces the following restrictions: minimum flow requirements, maximum between-day flow
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changes and maximum allowable ramping rates (Flathead Lakers [2005]).
In the economics literature, there are very few studies regarding the environmental
effect of ramping and the associated economic impact on hydro power operations. Some of
these studies include Veselka et al. [1995], Edwards et al. [1999], Edwards [2003], Harpman
[1999] and Chen and Forsyth [2008], who treat ramping rate restrictions as environmental
constraints in their optimization models. These papers (except Chen and Forsyth [2008])
assume that the power stations operate under a particular ramping rate regime, but do
not analyze the effect of various levels of ramping rate restrictions on the power station’s
optimal operation and profit. The trade offs involved in the choice of the optimal ramping
rate regime are not addressed. We attempt to fill in this gap in the literature by considering
both the associated benefits and costs of ramping restrictions on hydro profits and on total
daily hydro production and the potential implications for other sources of power.
There are some related cost and benefit studies similar to this chapter. Kotchen et al.
[2006] conduct a benefit-cost analysis of changing daily conditions from peaking to run-of-
river (ROR) flows for two hydroelectric dams in Michigan. They consider three categories
of costs and benefits related to the switch to ROR flow: electricity production costs, air
quality benefits, and recreational fishing benefits. Huppert [1999] estimates the costs of
protecting the endangered and threatened salmon, including the cost of environmental re-
strictions on hydropower operations in the Snake River. Jager and Bevelhimer [2007] review
hydropower projects with license-mandated changes from peaking to ROR operation, and
discuss producer costs and environmental benefits associated with operations: decreased
generation efficiency; higher energy cost of fossil fuels needed to replace hydropower during
peak versus off-peak hours; the negative costs of environmental externalities.
2.3 Assumptions and Model Formulation
The goal of the chapter is to examine the opportunity cost of ramping rate restrictions on
hydro power operations. Our approach is to consider the costs for a representative hydro
power plant. We assume that the hydro plant has signed a binding contract to supply a
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specified amount of power to a certain customer, which implies there is a minimum amount
of power that the plant must produce. Any power which is over and above the contracted
amount can be sold in the spot market. This is similar to the assumption in Veselka et al.
[1995], but contrasts with Edwards et al. [1999] in which the contract demand must be
met exactly with no production allowed over the contracted amount.
This hypothetical contract is a device to permit the estimation of the cost of ramping
restrictions. If ramping restrictions imply that the contract cannot be met at certain times
during the day, then another source of power must be purchased. The additional cost
of this alternative source of power is a measure of the opportunity cost of the ramping
restrictions.
The contract specifies the quantity of electricity exchanged for each time t. The price
is the spot market rate which is assumed known and non-stochastic. This is clearly un-
realistic, since a key feature of electricity prices is their high degree of volatility. In this
chapter we ignore uncertainty in both electricity demand and price, and focus solely on
the opportunity costs of ramping restrictions in a non-stochastic environment. The case
of uncertain demand and price is left for future research.
We also ignore the possibility that the hydro power station could provide any ancillary
services to the electricity market. For example, besides producing electricity, a hydro unit
can also provide spinning reserves, which means that some of its power capacity is put
aside to provide electricity in case of a power shortage somewhere over the network.
A typical hydroelectric generation system can consist of more than one independent
rivers, with one or several generating facilities and reservoirs in a series or in parallel, and
transmission lines to neighboring systems through which electricity may be exchanged.
In addition, reservoir management deals not only with power generation, but with recre-
ation, fishery and irrigation as well. In order to focus on the ramping issue of the station’s
operation, the proposed model will only consider the power generation aspect of one rep-
resentative station and issues related to system transmission and distribution are ignored
in this study. In brief, we will largely follow Edwards et al. [1999] in the theoretical for-
mulation of the model. Specific differences are noted in the model description later in this
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section.
The time horizon of the model is T periods, with each individual period indexed by
t = 1, ..., T . In the empirical example to follow we solve the optimization problem for each
hour over a five day period. In this case t represents one hour and T = 5X24 = 120
hours. We denote the number of days as N where N = 5. Each day is further divided
into on-peak and off-peak periods. We assume that the prevailing spot price during peak
periods will exceed that for off-peak periods. For the prototype hydro power station, there
are three alternative choices available to meet the contract demand: generation of hydro
power only; purchase of electricity on the spot market at prevailing prices and resale to
the consumer; or some combination of these two. The hydro power station operates under
various physical constraints and must also meet environmental and other policy constraints
set by the regulator. Here, we assume that the hydro operation is subject to the following
constraints:
• Maximum hourly up-ramping and down-ramping rates;
• Maximum daily total water release.4
• Maximum and minimum hourly
– water release rates;
– water spill rates;
– head requirements;
– water content;
– hydro power generation;
In addition, contract demand and the water balance equation must be satisfied at all times.
4In this model we do not explicitly include a constraint on the maximum daily change in water flow.
Normally, up-ramping and down-ramping are believed to have more a severe effect on the environment
compared with fluctuations in daily flow. Since our main focus is on the ramping rate, we assume the
allowable fluctuations in daily flow are large enough that our optimization results are not affected.
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The total amount of power provided to the market by the owner of the hydro station
comprises the portion derived from hydro generation and the portion derived from spot
market purchases and resale. For a specific hour, this can be written as follows:
qt = q
r
t + q
h
t (rt, ht(wt)). (2.1)
where qt is the total electricity supplied by the owner during period t; q
r
t is the electricity
purchased from the spot market for resale; and qht is the amount of hydro power generated
and sold in period t. Hydro generation is a function of rt, the water release rate during
period t, and ht, the head of the dam which depends on the amount of water in the
reservoir wt. The hydro power production function will be non-linear and is assumed to be
continuous and increasing with respect to both arguments 5,
∂qht
∂rt
> 0 and
∂qht
∂ht
> 0, but the
second order derivatives are assumed to be zero, i.e.,
∂2qht
∂2rt
= 0 and
∂2qht
∂2ht
= 0. We further
assume that qht (0, ht(wt)) = 0 and q
h
t (rt, 0) = 0, meaning that at any level of water head
when there is no water release the hydro power generation will be zero, and at any level
of water release rate, if the water head is zero there will be no power generated. For the
head function ht(wt), it is assumed that
∂ht
∂wt
> 0, ∂
2ht
∂2wt
= 0 and ht(0) = 0. The specific
functional form assumed for the hydro production function is given in Section 2.6.
Next, we assume that the equation of motion for water is governed by the following
formula6:
wt+1 = wt + α[it − rt − ft]. (2.2)
This equation states that the total amount of water in the reservoir at time t + 1, i.e.,
wt+1, equals to the total amount of water stored at time t, i.e., wt, plus the water inflows
(coming from snow melting, rain, runoff water and natural river flow) into the reservoir at
time t, i.e., it, minus the water outflows (turbine and spill flows) at time t, i.e., {rt, ft}. α is
5The more realistic hydro power production function is not continuous, but our simplified assumptions
still allow a good approximation of the actual function (see Harpman [1999]). In the empirical studies, we
use the production function given by Equation (2.26). It should be pointed out that for any specific dam,
to apply this production function, both the water release rate and water head should be within certain
limits as described in Equations (2.6) and (2.8)-(2.9). Normally, the upper and lower limits will be different
for various dams.
6This water balance equation differs from the one in Edwards et al. [1999] by the inclusion of spill flows.
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the conversion factor to convert water flow units into water volume units. In this chapter,
water flows are measured in Cubic-feet-per-second (CFS) and water volume is in acre feet.
Reservoir water losses due to seepage and evaporation are neglected 7. Here, the dam
possesses a mechanism to release water with and without hydro power generation. This
general formulation captures the case when it may be necessary to spill a large quantity
of water such as during a period of flooding. In practice the spill flow can be controlled
quite precisely by adjusting gate openings. However, spilling should be avoided as much
as possible, given that no electricity is produced in this case.
In addition, the hydro power station is required to meet contractual obligations for
power at any time of the day, so the sum of hydropower production and the purchased
power for resale must be sufficient to satisfy the contract demand of the day. This load
resource balance can be represented by the following equation:
qˆt≤qrt + qht (rt, ht(wt)). (2.3)
qˆt represents the contract demand during period t of the day.
We assume that the hydro power station is subject to the up-ramping and down-
ramping constraints which will limit its operational ability to increase or decrease the
water release rate in any given period. These two constraints can be expressed as:
rt+1 − rt≤ru. (2.4)
rt − rt+1≤rd. (2.5)
rt refers to water release in period t, which may be an on- or off-peak period. Equation (2.4)
limits the rate at which the water release rate can be increased between periods to ru.8 The
up-ramping limit will be determined by the physical capabilities of the particular hydro
turbine and the ramping rate constraint imposed by regulators to protect the environment.
In this chapter we concern ourselves only with the latter source of ramping restrictions.
7These assumptions are reasonable for a very short term analysis such as five days in this chapter.
8In general the desired ramping restrictions my vary over the hours in a day, and over months and
seasons as well. In this chapter we assume fixed ramping constraints.
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Similarly, Equation (2.5) limits the rate of ramping-down, i.e., the rate at which the water
release rate can be decreased between periods. Again we assume the ramping constraint
is imposed by regulators, although the physical characteristics of a particular hydro unit
may also limit down-ramping.
The hydro station also faces minimum and maximum water release rate requirements,
which can be represented as:
rmin≤rt≤rmax. (2.6)
Equation (2.6) limits the range of water release rate by rmin and rmax. Again we assume
the minimum and maximum water release rates are constant over any day and represent
regulatory requirements to protect the river ecosystem. The minimum release requirement
is loosely defined as the smallest amount of flow that can be left in the river without harming
downstream fish populations (Jager and Smith [2008]). By imposing these constraints, the
hydro power station’s operational flexibility may be significantly affected. Currently, many
hydro power stations operate under the minimum and maximum water release constraints.
Similarly, the station faces minimum and maximum water spill rate requirements (Catala˜o
et al. [2006]), denoted fmin and fmax respectively. These can be represented as:
fmin≤ft≤fmax (2.7)
In practice, especially during flood periods, spillways may release water so that the water
does not overtop and damage the dam. Spillways provide added flexibility of operations
given variations in water inflow.
Additional operational constraints include that the water level must remain between
specified minimum and maximum values. This implies the station faces minimum and
maximum water head requirements (Equation (2.8)), and upper and lower reservoir storage
constraints (Equation (2.9)), which may vary over the year (Catala˜o et al. [2006]). These
constraints can be stated as:
hmin≤ht≤hmax (2.8)
wmin≤wt≤wmax. (2.9)
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where, the water head lower bound is hmin and the water head upper bound is hmax. The
reservoir storage lower bound is wmin and the reservoir storage upper bound is wmax.
We further assume that the hydro station is facing minimum and maximum power
production constraints, which can be written as:
qmin≤qht≤qmax. (2.10)
These limits may be technical limits of hydro turbines or may reflect a constraint on the
amount of power that can be transmitted through power lines, perhaps due to congestion.
According to Edwards et al. [1999] and Harpman [1999] hydro dams typically are re-
quired to release a specified quantity of water each month. For example, in the United
States Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) are required to release specific amounts
of water for each dam during each month of the year (Edwards et al. [1999]). In this
chapter the optimization occurs over 5 days and it is assumed that there is a maximum
that can be released in each 24 hour period. The constraint is given by:
24∑
t=1
αrtj ≤ R, j = 1, ..., N. (2.11)
where α is the conversion factor to convert a water flow into a water volume and j indexes
each day. Additional optional constraints in the model can be easily imposed if required,
such as system reliability and ancillary service requirements; more detailed market condi-
tions; transmission losses and other operational details.
2.4 The Optimization Problem
In this section we formulate the optimization problem for the representative hydro power
station. The owner of the station is assumed to maximize profits subject to various con-
straints described in the previous section. Profit maximization involves determining the
amount of power production which depends in a non-linear fashion on water released
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through the turbine and on dam head, as given in Equation (2.1). Dam head is a reflec-
tion of water content in the reservoir. A hydro operator knows that water released today
reduces dam head and therefore the amount of power that can be produced in the next
period. Profit maximization over time involves choosing the level of water releases so that
the benefit in terms of electricity production today just offsets the opportunity cost in
terms of foregone future production and profits.
In order to keep our optimization problem of manageable size, our empirical analysis
considers a 5 day period 9 of operations. The optimal choices in any single day depend on
initial conditions, and in particular on the initial water content and dam head. To avoid
dependence on arbitrary initial conditions, we look for a steady state solution where the
optimal choice of water release and water level in the dam is unchanging from the previous
day. In our empirical example, we choose initial conditions for water level and the water
release rate that allow us to reach a steady state within the five day period. We then report
the results for a steady state day in all cases.
Our focus in this chapter is on ramping rate constraints, Equations (2.4) and (2.5), and
we measure their cost as the lost profit from having to meet these constraints, net of the
cost of any change in pollutant emissions caused by a change in the economy’s reliance on
thermal power. As noted earlier, we do not attempt to specify the benefits of environmental
restrictions in terms of reduced damages to the aquatic environment. This is beyond the
scope of the current chapter.
The representative hydro station’s power generation is assumed to be small in the
electricity market and hence is a price-taker during each period. The station charges the
spot market price for its power, whether generated by the station, purchased from the
spot market for resale, or some combination of the two. The power purchased for resale is
purchased and sold at the same spot price, so no net revenue is generated. However it is
assumed that an administrative cost is incurred, crt per kWh, so the hydro station incurs
a net loss on this transaction. A similar assumption is made in Edwards et al. [1999].
9This time period is sufficient for the results to reach (or nearly reach) a steady state. In the empirical
studies, the computational time for each case varies from less than an hour to several hours.
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This administrative cost 10 can be an arbitrarily small number, but is required to achieve
a reasonable solution to the optimization problem in that spot market purchases are only
made when needed to meet contract demand. The hydro generation and transmission
(G&T) costs are given by ch per unit of power and are assumed to be the same during
both off-peak and on-peak periods. The spot electricity price is denoted by pt per kWh
during time t.
The minimum amount of power produced or purchased by the hydro plant owner is
specified in the contract. Therefore, whatever the realized market conditions and water
inflows, contract demand must always be satisfied, and purchase for resale may become
necessary at some points in time. The option to purchase power in the spot market is
valuable to the hydro operator, since it means the contract demand can always be met. In
the empirical examples that follow we assume water inflow is deterministic, but in practice
the uncertainty and variability of water inflow due to weather conditions may impact the
amount of electricity that a hydro station can generate in any given period. The stochastic
nature of water flows would give added value to the ability to satisfy contract demand with
spot market purchases. In addition, this option also creates value by giving the operator
the flexibility of hydro-shifting. Hydro-shifting refers to the practice of shifting production
to on-peak periods when prices are highest. In off-peak periods, contract demand can be
satisfied through spot market purchases.
The total profit of providing power over the T periods is given by the following equation:
T∑
t=1
{
(pt − ch)qht (rt, ht(wt))− crtqrt
}
. (2.12)
The first term inside the brace accounts for the total profit from generating hydroelectric
power, given the hourly spot prices. The second term inside the brace represents the net
cost of purchasing power for resale from the spot market. It is the per unit administrative
cost crt multiplied by the quantity of spot market purchases.
The optimization problem is to maximize Equation (2.12) subject to a suite of con-
10Assuming a small administrative cost could avoid spot market purchases when not needed.
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straints. The set of control variables includes the water release rate for power generation,
the water spill rate and the amount of power to purchase for resale for each period t, i.e.,
{rt, ft, qrt }. The state variables is the water content, wt. Exogenous variables including the
water inflow rate, electricity demand, and electricity price for each period t, i.e., {it, qˆt, pt}
are assumed to be known and deterministic. This is a deterministic dynamic non-linear
optimization problem. The objective function and constraints are given below in Equations
(2.13)-(2.24). The constraints 11 are as detailed in Section 2.3, with the addition of the
non-negativity constraint, Equation (2.23).
max
rt,ft,qrt
T∑
t=1
{
(pt − ch)qht (rt, ht(wt))− crtqrt
}
. (2.13)
Subject to
wt = wt−1 − α(rt−1 + ft−1) + αit−1, t = 2, ..., T. (2.14)
qˆt≤qrt + qht (rt, ht(wt)), t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.15)
rt − rt−1≤ru, t = 2, ..., T. (2.16)
rt−1 − rt≤rd, t = 2, ..., T. (2.17)
rmin≤rt≤rmax, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.18)
fmin≤ft≤fmax, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.19)
hmin≤ht≤hmax, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.20)
wmin≤wt≤wmax, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.21)
qmin≤qht≤qmax, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.22)
0≤qrt , t = 1, 2, ..., T. (2.23)
11Equations (2.14)-(2.22) and (2.24) represent the equation of motion for water, load resource balance,
maximum up-ramping constraint, maximum down-ramping constraint, minimum and maximum water
release rate requirements, minimum and maximum water spill rate requirements, minimum and maximum
water head requirements, upper and lower reservoir storage constraints, minimum and maximum power
production constraints, and maximum daily release constraint respectively.
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24∑
t=1
αrtj ≤ R, j = 1, ..., N. (2.24)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this mathematical programming problem can
be easily derived. This type of analysis admits two possible solution forms. The first is
an interior solution characterized by all endogenous variables having positive values at the
optimum (i.e., the dispatcher relies on both thermal power resales and hydro generation
in both periods). The second is a corner solution, in which at least one of the endogenous
variables will take on a zero value at the optimum (e.g., no thermal power is sold or no
hydro power is generated in one of the periods). For the empirical studies in the following
sections, we will specify the optimization problem, and obtain solutions using Matlab.12
2.5 Data Description
The prototype hydro plant used in our empirical example is based on a medium-sized
plant in Ontario. We construct our example using some specifications of an Ontario Power
Generation (OPG) generating station, as well as our own assumptions based on input from
a variety of sources. An example of a medium-sized hydro plant is OPG’s Abitibi Canyon
generating station located on the Abitibi River in northeastern Ontario. Details of the
generating station can be found on the OPG web site,13 and in Statistics Canada [2000]
and Hendry and Chang [2001].14
OPG owns 65 hydro generating stations with a total capacity of 6,963 megawatts (MW).
The Abitibi Canyon station consists of five generating units and has a total generation
capacity of about 336 MW. In terms of water inflow, the combined physical capacity of the
generators is assumed to be about 19 thousand Cubic-feet-per-second (CFS) of water. The
12Using Matlab’s optimization tool fmincon.
13For example, see http://www.opg.com/power/hydro/northeast plant group/abitibi.asp and
http://www.opg.com/power/.
14Hendry and Chang [2001] investigated the composition and structure of fish communities, and habitat
features in the Abitibi Canyon generating station tailwater. Further information about the Abitibi Station
is available in their study.
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storage capacity of the reservoir is assumed to be about 17 thousand acre-feet of water.
We model the optimal operation of the hydro station over a 24 hour period assuming
it faces a contract demand requirement that ranges from 112 MW during the off-peak
period to 336 MW during the on-peak period (Table 2.1). This contract is hypothetical
and mimics the daily pattern of Ontario electricity demand. The contract demand can be
met either by generating hydroelectricity, or purchasing power from the spot market for
resale, or some combination of both.
Consistent with the empirical observations, peak hours are specified as being from 6
AM to 11 PM Mondays through Fridays, and off-peak hours are from 11 PM to 6 AM.
Each 24 hour period begins at 11 PM, with 11 PM - 12 PM labeled as the first hour. This
can be seen in Table 2.1.
Data for the Hourly Ontario Electricity Price (HOEP) from 01 May 2002 to 30 Novem-
ber 2006 is used to determine reasonable assumptions for electricity prices. Based on the
definitions of off-peak and on-peak periods, we calculate the average prices for both periods
using these data. The average spot electricity price is 36.33 $/MWh during the off-peak
period and 62.13 $/MWh during the on-peak period, which will be used in our empirical
analysis (Table 2.1). We also assume that purchase for resale incurs an administrative cost
of 2 $/MWh, which will be paid by the hydro operator. This is the amount assumed in
Edwards et al. [1999]. In addition, the cost of generating hydroelectric power is assumed
constant at 20 $/MWh in both off-peak and on-peak periods for the hydro station.
Actual water inflows are stochastic in nature, but are handled here in a deterministic
manner in this analysis. Based on data for the historical water inflow for the Abitibi
Canyon from 01 January 2001 to 30 November 2006, we calculate an average daily amount
of 6,671 CFS.15 We abstract from fluctuations in water inflow over a typical day, and
assume that inflow is a constant 6,671 CFS for each hour.
15This daily average excludes the months of April and May which are atypical with water inflows
significantly higher than the rest of the year. When calculating the daily average, we also ignore the
seasonal variation of water inflows over the years (excluding the months of April and May). The analysis
for a specific season could be easily conducted by using the daily average corresponding to the season.
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2.6 Modeling Hydropower Generation
In this section, we specify the hydro power production function and the gross head function.
The production function we adopt is standard in the power engineering literature, and is
identical to that used in Philpott et al. [2000]. Water flowing through a turbine generates
electricity by changing its potential energy into electrical energy. The amount of power
available from a hydro power station is proportional to the product of its water flow rate,
its water head and its generation efficiency. The hydro electricity generation function is
determined empirically and is, in general, a non-linear function of the turbine discharge
and the gross head. The amount of electricity produced by each unit (turbine) can be
calculated using the following relation:
qht (rt, wt) ∝ rtht(rt, wt)e(rt, ht). (2.25)
where, qht is the power output, rt is the flow rate, ht is the gross head, e is the efficiency
factor and ∝ means proportion. Gross head refers to the vertical distance between the top
of the penstock that conveys water under pressure and the point where the water discharges
from the turbine. Here, the gross head is a function of the flow rate and the water content,
and can be represented as ht(rt, wt). The generation efficiency in converting water flow to
electrical power is a non-linear function of the flow rate and the gross head of the water
flowing through the turbine, and can be written as e(rt, ht). Due to the complexity of this
nonseparable hydro production function, we have chosen to make a number of simplifying
assumptions about its functional form for our model. Following Harpman [1999], Equation
(2.25) becomes:
qht (rt, ht(wt)) = 0.001 g rt ht(wt) e. (2.26)
where, g is the gravitational constant (32.15 feet-per-square-second) and the factor 0.001
converts qht to MW from KW, rt is in CFS and ht is in feet. According to Equation
(2.26) gross head is only a function of the water content and does not vary with the flow
rate, and the generation efficiency is kept as constant over the course of our (short-term)
planning horizon (Hreinsson [1988]). Energy is always lost when converted from one form
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to another, and all the equipment used to convert power available in the flowing water
to electrical power is less than 100 percent efficient. We use an efficiency factor of 0.87.
Therefore, the right hand side of Equation (2.26) can be rewritten as 0.001×32.15×0.87×
rtht(wt) = 0.028rtht(wt) where rt is in CFS and ht is in feet. This simple formulation of the
hydroelectric generating plant’s production function has the characteristics of convexity,
continuity and smoothness, which implies that standard optimization techniques can be
usefully applied.
The level of head can be expressed as function of the water content in the reservoir.
Due to the unavailability of some key data, following Edwards et al. [1999] we make the
simplifying assumption of a linear functional form which can be written as:
ht(wt) = βwt (2.27)
where, wt is the water content in acre-feet. Then the parameter value of beta can be
approximated using the available data. Under the normal operating range, the calibrated
beta16 value is 0.0089. The advantage of using linear functional form is that only one
parameter needs to be calibrated and it provides a good approximation when converting
from gross head to reservoir storage, particularly for reservoirs with high inflows but small
storage capacities.
2.7 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we examine three optimization cases under various operational and envi-
ronmental constraints. The baseline case optimizes Equation (2.13) subject to Equations
(2.14), (2.15), and Equations (2.19) through (2.24). The second case adds both the mini-
mum and maximum water release requirements given by Equation (2.18). The third case
adds extra up-ramping and down-ramping constraints, which are Equations (2.16)-(2.17).
16If the key data are available, we could specify a more realistic function form for Equation (2.27) and
perform a goodness of fit test of the calibrated model.
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Hourly contract demand, given in Table 2.1, is based on the contract used in Edwards
et al. [1999] but is scaled up to match the production capacity of our medium-sized proto-
type hydro station. For the baseline case the constraints are specified as follows:
• The minimum spill rate is 0 CFS and the maximum spill rate is 10,000 CFS;
• The minimum water content requirement is 7,000 acre-feet and the maximum value
is 17,497 acre-feet;
• Hydro capacity varies from 0 MW to 336 MW;
• A maximum of 13,100 acre-feet of water may be released during a 24 hour period for
power generation;
For the case with release rate constraints the following restrictions are added to the baseline
case:
• The minimum water release requirement is 2,000 CFS and the maximum release
constraint is 15,000 CFS;
For the case with ramping rate constraints the following restrictions are added to the
baseline case:
• Up-ramping and down-ramping constraints are 1,000 Cubic-feet-per-second per hour
(CFS-hr);
• The minimum water release requirement is 2,000 CFS and the maximum release
constraint is 15,000 CFS;
The constraint on the maximum quantity of water release during a 24 hour period for
power generation may be thought of as an environmental constraint ensuring that the dam
will not be drained in any period or it may be a technical constraint of the turbines. Note
that this constraint on total release does not include spillage. Spillage will always be kept
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values Used in the Empirical Examples
Hour Time (Hour) Demand (MW) Water Inflow (CFS) Price ($/MWh)
0 10pm-11pm 199 6671 62
1st 11pm-12pm 159 6671 36
2nd 12pm-1am 112 6671 36
3rd 1am-2am 116 6671 36
4th 2am-3am 116 6671 36
5th 3am-4am 114 6671 36
6th 4am-5am 125 6671 36
7th 5am-6am 128 6671 36
8th 6am-7am 134 6671 62
9th 7am-8am 146 6671 62
10th 8am-9am 164 6671 62
11th 9am-10am 181 6671 62
12th 10am-11am 199 6671 62
13th 11am-12am 226 6671 62
14th 12am-1pm 267 6671 62
15th 1pm-2pm 291 6671 62
16th 2pm-3pm 314 6671 62
17th 3pm-4pm 336 6671 62
18th 4pm-5pm 336 6671 62
19th 5pm-6pm 336 6671 62
20th 6pm-7pm 336 6671 62
21st 7pm-8pm 336 6671 62
22nd 8pm-9pm 291 6671 62
23rd 9pm-10pm 251 6671 62
24th 10pm-11pm 199 6671 62
to a minimum as it does not contribute to profits. In the following examples the constraint
on the maximum quantity of water release is set slightly below the total quantity of water
inflow during the day implying that once the desired water level is obtained in the dam,
it will be necessary to spill a certain amount each day to avoid overtopping.17 In practice
the option to spill allows a hydro operator flexibility in cases where water inflow is higher
than normal. This is not an issue in our empirical example in which water inflow does not
vary from one hour to the next.
We begin the optimization by choosing an initial water release rate and water content.
The optimization proceeds over the 5 day period. Through the choice of optimal hourly
17One CFS for 1 hour converts to approximated 0.082646 acre-feet. Converting the water inflow in each
hour in Table 2.1 and adding over the 24 hour period gives 13,232 acre-feet as the total inflow.
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water releases, the water level in the dam changes over time until a steady state is reached so
that subsequent days are identical to the previous day. The initial conditions are specified
so that a steady state is reached (or nearly reached) within the five day optimization
scenario.18 We report results for the fourth day for all cases. The first 7 hours of any day
represent the off-peak period and the next 17 hours represent the on-peak period.
The results of the optimization are reported in the following sections. We begin with
the baseline which uses the basic operational constraints, but no restrictions on minimum
and maximum releases and ramping. The operational constraints are Equations (2.14)
(water balance), (2.15) (contract demand) and (2.19)-(2.24), which are constraints on water
spillage, head level, water content, hydro production, resale power, and total water release.
Although our focus is on ramping constraints, we first consider the impact of minimum
and maximum flow constraints alone and then add on ramping constraints.
2.7.1 Baseline Optimization
The base case results for a steady state day are reported in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1. In
Table 2.2, water release is seen to be zero during the off-peak hours. The spillage shown
during off-peak periods is the amount needed to equalize flow into and out of the dam,
so that the water level remains unchanged. During on-peak hours, water releases rise
fairly steadily, peaking at 11,343 CFS at the 24th hour. The largest ramping-up in the
water release rate occurs from the 7th to the 8th hour which is the cross over point from
off-peak to on-peak. Similarly, the largest ramping-down occurs between the 10pm-11pm
and 11pm-12pm periods of the day, which is at the cross point from the on-peak period
to the off-peak period. During the off-peak period contract demand is satisfied only by
purchasing power from the market for resale. During on-peak hours contract demand is
met by hydro power only and for a significant number of hours more hydro electricity
is produced than the contract requires. No thermal power is purchased for resale in this
18An initial water release rate of 7,000 CFS is used in all cases. An initial water content of 14,000
acre-feet is used for the cases without ramping rate restrictions, while 17,000 acre-feet is used for the cases
with ramping rate restrictions. The steady state is optimum since we are solving a convex optimization
problem under the simplified assumptions for the hydro power production function.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Experiment
Hour Time (Hour) Water Con-
tent (Acre-
feet)
Spillway
(CFS)
Water
Release
(CFS)
Hydro
Generation
(MW)
Power
Purchase
(MW)
Total
Power
(MW)
0 10pm-11pm 13768 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1st 11pm-12pm 14307 157 0 0 159 159
2nd 12pm-1am 14817 490 0 0 112 112
3rd 1am-2am 15357 146 0 0 116 116
4th 2am-3am 15888 236 0 0 116 116
5th 3am-4am 16433 85 0 0 114 114
6th 4am-5am 16947 451 0 0 125 125
7th 5am-6am 17497 10 0 0 128 128
8th 6am-7am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
9th 7am-8am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
10th 8am-9am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
11th 9am-10am 17375 0 8147 304 0 304
12th 10am-11am 17175 0 9093 336 0 336
13th 11am-12am 16966 0 9205 336 0 336
14th 12am-1pm 16746 0 9326 336 0 336
15th 1pm-2pm 16516 0 9456 336 0 336
16th 2pm-3pm 16275 0 9596 336 0 336
17th 3pm-4pm 16020 0 9748 336 0 336
18th 4pm-5pm 15752 0 9914 336 0 336
19th 5pm-6pm 15469 0 10095 336 0 336
20th 6pm-7pm 15170 0 10295 336 0 336
21st 7pm-8pm 14853 0 10515 336 0 336
22nd 8pm-9pm 14515 0 10759 336 0 336
23rd 9pm-10pm 14154 0 11033 336 0 336
24th 10pm-11pm 13768 0 11343 336 0 336
period. Clearly, in this case the absence of minimum and maximum release constraints and
ramping constraints allows for rather dramatic changes in water release rates. Figure 2.1
plots the total power (hydro production and resale power), contract demand, hydroelectric
production and power purchase for resale under this baseline case. It shows a clear pattern
of hydro-shifting.
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Figure 2.1: Hydro and Thermal Power Production: Baseline Experiment
These results make sense intuitively and are consistent with Edwards et al. [1999].
Because of the upper limit on the total water flow through the turbine in any one day,
it is in the interests of the hydro operator to release the permitted water flow when the
electricity price is highest, which is during on-peak hours. In addition, the requirement
that sufficient power must be sold during the base period in order to satisfy the demand
requirement, induces the decision maker to purchase and resell thermal power during the
off-peak period to satisfy this contract demand. To maximize the value of hydro resources,
the power station stores water during the off-peak period for release during the on-peak
period, and sells thermal power during the base period to satisfy the demand requirement
of its customers.
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2.7.2 Optimization with Release Rate Constraints
In this second optimization, we impose a minimum release requirement of 2,000 CFS and
a maximum release requirement of 15,000 CFS. Together with the operational constraints
in the first scenario, these constraints cause several major changes in the water release
profile during the representative day (Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2). First, off-peak period
releases increase to satisfy the new minimum release rate constraint and are maintained at
the lower bound of 2,000 CFS from the 1st hour up to the 7th hour of the representative
day. As a result, from the 8th hour to the 24th hour water releases are either slightly lower
than or the same as the baseline case. This indicates that, during the off-peak period, it
is optimal to maintain the minimum release rate and to purchase from the spot market
the remaining power needed to meet the demand requirement. During the on-peak period,
since the electricity prices are much higher, it is desirable to keep the water release rate
similar to the baseline case.
During the off-peak period, at a release rate of 2,000 CFS the produced hydro power
is lower than the contract demand, however during the on-peak period the hydro power
production is either higher than or equal to the contract demand. Correspondingly, power
resales are lower during the off-peak hours than under the baseline case. As in the baseline
case, there are no power resales in the on-peak period.
Also consistent with the baseline case, up-ramping is highest from the 7th to the 8th
hour and down-ramping is highest from 10pm-11pm to 11pm-12pm. However, these ramp-
ing rate peaks have lower magnitudes than in the baseline case. As shown in Table 2.3, the
maximum release constraint is never binding during the on-peak period. Maximum water
release occurs from 10pm -11pm, and at 10,463 CFS is less that in the baseline case. After
imposing the minimum and maximum release constraints, hydro-shifting is still apparent,
but less significant compared with the baseline case, as is illustrated in Figure 2.2. This
indicates that these extra environmental constraints limit the station’s ability to make full
use of the benefit of hydro-shifting, and therefore reduce its value.
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Table 2.3: Case Including Minimum and Maximum Release Constraints
Hour Time (Hour) Water Con-
tent (Acre-
feet)
Spillway
(CFS)
Water
Release
(CFS)
Hydro
Generation
(MW)
Power
Purchase
(MW)
Total
Power
(MW)
0 10pm-11pm 14925 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1st 11pm-12pm 15311 0 2000 66 93 159
2nd 12pm-1am 15697 0 2000 67 45 112
3rd 1am-2am 16083 0 2000 69 47 116
4th 2am-3am 16469 0 2000 71 46 117
5th 3am-4am 16855 0 2000 72 42 114
6th 4am-5am 17241 0 2000 74 51 125
7th 5am-6am 17497 1574 2000 75 52 127
8th 6am-7am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
9th 7am-8am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
10th 8am-9am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
11th 9am-10am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
12th 10am-11am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
13th 11am-12am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
14th 12am-1pm 17419 0 7621 285 0 285
15th 1pm-2pm 17220 0 9069 336 0 336
16th 2pm-3pm 17013 0 9179 336 0 336
17th 3pm-4pm 16796 0 9298 336 0 336
18th 4pm-5pm 16569 0 9426 336 0 336
19th 5pm-6pm 16330 0 9564 336 0 336
20th 6pm-7pm 16078 0 9713 336 0 336
21st 7pm-8pm 15813 0 9876 336 0 336
22nd 8pm-9pm 15534 0 10053 336 0 336
23rd 9pm-10pm 15238 0 10248 336 0 336
24th 10pm-11pm 14925 0 10463 336 0 336
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Figure 2.2: Hydro and Thermal Power Production: Experiment with Minimum and Max-
imum Release Constraints
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2.7.3 Optimization with Ramping Rate Constraints
In this scenario we add up-ramping and down-ramping restrictions, both of which are set
initially at 1,000 CFS-hr. As Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3 illustrate, with ramping restrictions
the highest on-peak water release rate during the representative day reaches the maximum
of 9,621 CFS in the 20th hour, which is lower than the previous two cases. The ramping
constraints reduce the extent of hydro-shifting that is possible. In the off-peak period, the
hydro power station gradually ramps down the water release rate, and then in the on-peak
period gradually ramps up again. However while still in the on-peak period, after the 20th
hour, ramping down has commenced in preparation for the approaching off-peak period.
The change in the pattern of hydro production over the day compared to the previous
scenarios is most easily seen in Figure 2.3 compared to Figure 2.2. With the maximum
allowable release during a day, the increase in hydro production during the off-peak period
implies there will be a reduction during the on-peak period. During the 21st and 22nd
hours a small portion of demand is met by purchases of thermal power. The inability to
fully satisfy peak demand with hydro production will have a negative effect on profits.
2.7.4 Comparing the Three Optimization Scenarios
Figure 2.4 compares water release rates for these three optimization scenarios. From this
graph the shifting of hydro production from the on-peak to the off-peak period is very
evident for the case with minimum and maximum flow constraints compared to the baseline.
This shift is even larger for the case with ramping constraints.
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Table 2.4: Case Including Up-ramping and Down-ramping Constraints
Hour Time (Hour) Water Con-
tent (Acre-
feet)
Spillway
(CFS)
Water
Release
(CFS)
Hydro
Generation
(MW)
Power
Purchase
(MW)
Total
Power
(MW)
0 10pm-11pm 15876 N/A 6490 N/A N/A N/A
1st 11pm-12pm 15974 0 5490 188 0 188
2nd 12pm-1am 16154 0 4490 156 0 156
3rd 1am-2am 16417 0 3490 123 0 123
4th 2am-3am 16762 0 2490 90 27 117
5th 3am-4am 17093 0 2671 98 16 114
6th 4am-5am 17341 0 3671 137 0 137
7th 5am-6am 17497 108 4671 176 0 176
8th 6am-7am 17497 1000 5671 213 0 213
9th 7am-8am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
10th 8am-9am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
11th 9am-10am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
12th 10am-11am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
13th 11am-12am 17497 0 6671 251 0 251
14th 12am-1pm 17461 0 7110 267 0 267
15th 1pm-2pm 17342 0 8110 302 0 302
16th 2pm-3pm 17140 0 9110 336 0 336
17th 3pm-4pm 16929 0 9225 336 0 336
18th 4pm-5pm 16708 0 9347 336 0 336
19th 5pm-6pm 16476 0 9478 336 0 336
20th 6pm-7pm 16233 0 9621 336 0 336
21st 7pm-8pm 16029 0 9134 315 21 336
22nd 8pm-9pm 15908 0 8134 278 13 291
23rd 9pm-10pm 15870 0 7134 243 8 251
24th 10pm-11pm 15915 0 6134 210 0 210
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Figure 2.3: Hydro and Thermal Power Production: Experiment with Up-ramping and
Down-ramping Constraints
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Figure 2.4: Comparing Water Release Rates for Hydro Production
The impact of these constraints on profits for a range of ramping constraints is detailed
in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5 19. In general, the more restrictive the constraint the greater is
the limitation on the station’s operational flexibility and the larger the impact on profits.
Under the baseline case, the total profit from providing power is $226 thousand. For Case
I with the minimum and maximum release constraints, the total daily profit drops to
$223 thousand, representing a 1.1% reduction over the baseline scenario. When ramping
constraints of 5,000 CSF-hr are added in Case II profit drops marginally to $222 thousand
19Case I is min/max release constraints only. Cases II through VIII include min/max release constraints
as well as equal up and down ramping constraints respectively in CFS-hr of 5,000, 4,000, 3,000, 2,000,
1,000, 500, and 250. The percentage change of total profit is shown in Table 2.5.
39
which is 1.7% less than the baseline. As ramping rate restrictions are increased profits
continue to drop, until at a restriction of 250 CSF-hr, i.e., the water release rate can
increase or decrease by at most 250 CFS between any two consecutive hours, then the
total profit drops to as low as $208 thousand, which is an 8% decrease relative to the
baseline. From Figure 2.5 we also observe profits fall proportionately more as ramping
restrictions are increased when ramping rates are already quite restrictive - i.e. for rates
of less than 2,000 CFS-hr20.
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$219 295220000
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Figure 2.5: Comparing Profit Levels
20This could be viewed as the threshold between the sensitive and insensitive regions for the impact of
ramping constraints on profits.
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Power Production Levels
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Figure 2.7: Comparing Water Content across Cases
In Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6 21, we report total power sales, hydro power generation,
and spot purchases for resale. Interestingly we observe that total power sales are affected,
implying that the impact of the restrictions is not simply a redistribution from on-peak to
off-peak periods. We observe the largest power production level in the most restrictive case
(ramping rate constraints of 250 CFS-hr). Figure 2.7 gives a clue as to why this is so. In
this figure water content by hour is shown for the baseline case, the case of min/max release
constraints and the cases of 250 and 1,000 CFS-hr up and down ramping restrictions. The
21Case I is min/max release constraints only. Cases II through VIII include min/max release constraints
as well as equal up and down ramping constraints respectively in CFS-hr of 5,000, 4,000, 3,000, 2,000,
1,000, 500, and 250.
43
flat portions on the graph are periods when water content is at the upper limit. Starting
at a given initial water content, as optimization proceeds over the 5 day period the optimal
choice of water release and spillage affects the water content of the dam. By the time a
steady state is achieved, the water level profile by hour over a 24 hour period remains the
same from one day to the next and the amount of spillage in one day is chosen so that the
water level in the dam is maintained.
We observe from Figure 2.7 that the optimal water levels for the restricted cases
(min/max release constraints and ramping rate constraints) are greater than or equal to
the water level for the baseline case. Further, the ramping rate case shows a higher water
level than the min/max release constraint case for many hours of the day. The larger
water content is a result of optimal choices necessitated by the restrictions and allows the
operator to generate more power with a given water release rate (recall Equation 2.26).
This is needed in order to produce as much as possible during on-peak periods despite the
ramping constraints.
In Figure 2.6 different levels of restrictions can also be seen to have an impact on the
level of power purchased for resale. The largest amount of resale power occurs in the base
case without restrictions. Resale power is reduced as ramping restrictions are made more
restrictive moving from 5,000 CFS-hr to 1,000 CFS-hr. However for restrictions of 500 and
250 CFS-hr an increase in the purchase of resale power is observed. This purchase happens
in peak period hours, and without it the hydro operator would be unable to meet contract
demand. In summary, we observe that the ramping restrictions have caused an increased
reliance on hydro-power22 and a decreased reliance on purchases for resale compared to the
baseline case. This is a somewhat counter intuitive result.
The results we have shown so far for our prototype Ontario dam are consistent with
Edwards et al. [1999]. Edwards showed that ramping restrictions increase the amount of
hydro sold in the off-peak period and reduce it in the on-peak period and thereby reduce
overall profitability of the hydro operations. Our results differ from Edwards in the finding
that total hydro production may increase as ramping restrictions are imposed. This follows
22Ramping restrictions cause an increase of the water content compared to the baseline case (Figure
2.7), therefore the hydro power generation also increases over a 24 hour period.
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from our assumption that total hydro sales can exceed contract demand, and that as the
hydro operator optimizes water releases over several days the water level in the dam adjusts
until a steady state is reached. The ability to increase hydro production is a means for the
operator to reduce the impact of ramping restrictions on profits. However, profitability is
still affected with the most significant effects coming when ramping is restricted to 1,000
CFS-hr and less.
2.8 Including the Environmental Impact of Changes
in Thermal Generation
In the previous sections, we detailed the impact of ramping restrictions on the profitability
of the firm. However in setting a ramping rate policy a regulator should consider other
potential impacts that will affect the public good. Ideally the determination of an optimal
level of ramping constraints would begin with a comprehensive environmental assessment
of the positive effect of various levels of ramping restrictions on the river ecosystem. Ev-
idence on the benefits for the aquatic ecosystem would be weighed against the negative
effects on hydro station profits as well as the environmental impact of the change in re-
liance on other sources of power generation such as fossil fuels. If one were able to put a
dollar value on each of these effects, the optimal ramping rate restrictions could be chosen.
However, practically it is very difficult to measure the environmental effect of ramping on
the river ecosystem based on biological studies and it is even more challenging to calcu-
late this effect quantitatively in terms of monetary value. Currently, there is very limited
research on this environmental effect and no studies available to provide some appropriate
monetary measure of the environmental benefit of ramping restrictions. In contrast, there
are estimates available of the environmental costs of thermal power generation. In this
section we estimate the difference in environmental damages due to the change in reliance
on thermal generation as a result of ramping rate restrictions and add this to the loss in
hydro profits to get an estimate of the total cost of ramping restrictions.
In this section we investigate the impact of imposing up-ramping and down-ramping
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restrictions when minimum and maximum flow restrictions are already in place. We will
measure the unit environmental cost ($/MWh) of the replacement power by using an
estimate of the marginal external cost of emissions of a thermal generation plant. These
emissions include SO2, NOx and CO2. We consider two cases for thermal (replacement)
power: (i) replacement power is generated with coal during both the off-peak and on-peak
periods; or (ii) it is generated with coal during the off-peak period and natural gas during
the on-peak period 23.
In the empirical results presented in Section 2.7, we found that in the steady state, when
ramping constraints were imposed, hydro production decreased during on-peak periods and
increased during off-peak periods. Overall total hydro power production increased in the
24 hour period as ramping restrictions became increasingly tight. We assume that total
market demand and production for electricity are not affected by the hydro power plant’s
operation. It follows that every unit change in hydro power production will be exactly
offset by a change in thermal power generation. As a consequence, these flow restrictions
will result in a decrease in polluting emissions from thermal power during off-peak hours
and an increase in on-peak hours. Overall on a daily basis we will observe a reduction in
pollutant emissions from thermal power.
For the first case, this environmental benefit is calculated as the total net increase in
hydro production over the 24 hour period after imposing the ramping restrictions (which
also equals the change in the amount of thermal power) multiplied by the marginal external
costs of emissions for coal. For the second case, the associated total environmental benefit
is calculated as the increase in the amount of hydro power generation during the off-peak
period after imposing the ramping restrictions multiplied the marginal external costs of
emissions for coal, minus the reduced amount of hydro power generation during the on-peak
period after imposing the ramping restrictions multiplied by the marginal external costs
of emissions for natural gas. The benefit of emissions reduction from thermal generation
is subtracted from the lost profit caused by ramping restrictions which gives the net cost
23In Kotchen et al. [2006], they assume that the thermal (replacement) power during peak periods is
generated with fuel oil and natural gas, while thermal power during off-peak periods is generated with coal
only.
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of the ramping restrictions, ignoring any benefits that accrue to the aquatic ecosystem.
This cost estimate provides a lower bound on the level of benefits to the aquatic ecosystem
which would make ramping constraints worthwhile.
We consider the benefits of reduced emissions from thermal plants for the scenarios
examined in the previous section of equal levels of up-ramping and down-ramping con-
straints. For the marginal external costs of emissions, we choose both the high and low
cost estimates.24 For coal, these are 67.18 $/MWh and 45.20 $/MWh. For natural gas,
these are 9.96 $/MWh and 7.44 $/MWh.
The results for the scenario with coal as replacement power under various equal levels of
up-ramping and down-ramping constraints are reported in Figure 2.8 25. As we can observe,
at any given level of ramping restrictions, higher marginal external costs of emissions
always result in higher associated environmental benefits. However the cost in terms of
lost profits nearly always exceeds the benefit from any reduction in pollution from thermal
fired generation. Only for the most restrictive ramping rate (250 CFS-hr) and with the
higher estimate for marginal external costs of pollution do we observe that the benefit
from reduced thermal emissions exceeds the cost from lost profit. If we could measure the
associated environmental benefits for the river ecosystem, these could be directly included
in a cost benefit analysis. The net cost lines show how large this benefit would have to
be to justify ramping restrictions. Using the high marginal external cost estimate (green
lines) we see that the necessary ecosystem benefit actually declines as ramping constraints
are made more restrictive, getting smaller from 1,000 CFS-hr.
24These estimates are first calculated based on the coal generation plant’s marginal external costs (MEC)
in the US in 2004 (Dewees [2008]). We use the Michigan MEC at 34.77 $US/MWh (low MEC scenario),
and the Ohio MEC at 51.68 $US/MWh (high MEC scenario). Then these values are converted to Canadian
dollars at the 2004 exchange rate of 1.3 $CAD/$US. Natural gas emissions and external costs for gas-fired
power plants are much lower than those of coal. The gas-fired power plant’s marginal external cost is 5.72
$US/MWh for Michigan (low MEC scenario) and 7.66 $US/MWh for Indiana (high MEC scenario).
25‘Benefit’ curves show the extra environmental benefit under various levels of ramping rate restrictions
using either 67.18 $/MWh or 45.20 $/MWh as a proxy for the marginal environmental cost of coal fired
power. ‘Cost’ refers to the generator’s cost (reduction of profit) under various levels of ramping rate
restrictions. The ‘net cost’ curves show the ‘cost’ minus ‘benefit’ for the two different estimate of the
marginal environmental cost of thermal power.
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The results for the scenario with coal as replacement power during the off-peak period
and natural gas as replacement power during the on-peak period under various equal levels
of up-ramping and down-ramping constraints are reported in Figure 2.9 26. With more and
26‘Benefit’ curves show the extra environmental benefit under various levels of ramping rate restrictions
using either 67.18 $/MWh or 45.20 $/MWh as a proxy for the marginal environmental cost of coal fired
power and 9.96 $/MWh or 7.44 $/MWh as the marginal environmental cost of natural gas fired power.
‘Cost’ refers to the generator’s cost (reduction of profit) under various levels of ramping rate restric-
tions. The ‘net cost’ curves show the ‘cost’ minus ‘benefit’ for the two different estimate of the marginal
environmental cost of thermal power.
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more restrictive ramping constraints, both the cost curve and the environmental benefit
curves move up steadily, but the environmental benefit curves increase at a slightly faster
rate and are always located above the cost curve. The net cost curves are always below zero
and move down steadily with increasing ramping restrictions. This follows because with
increasing ramping restrictions the environmental benefit gained through the reduction
of thermal power generated using coal in the off-peak period exceeds by an increasing
amount the associated loss of profit and the environmental cost of increased thermal power
generated using natural gas in the on-peak period. In this example, the greater the ramping
restrictions, the greater the net social benefit. Optimal ramping restrictions are shown to be
250 CFS-hr even without any consideration of the potential benefits to the river ecosystem.
Our assumption of a one-for-one replacement of thermal power by hydro power, with no
effects on price, is clearly overly simplistic, but illustrates the importance of looking at the
impact of hydro ramping rates on other sources of electricity generation. In Ontario, coal
generation is being phased out as part of government policy to reduce air pollution. As
the province moves to “greener” sources of power the potential for an associated positive
impact of ramping restrictions on air quality will be reduced.
2.9 Conclusions
The ability of hydro facilities to respond quickly through ramping to changing demand
conditions is one of the benefits of hydro power. However the possibility of negative
consequences of ramping on aquatic ecosystems needs to be considered by regulators. These
negative impacts are case specific, dependent on the ecological conditions of particular
rivers and streams. In cases where ramping rate restrictions are being considered, there
should be a recognition of the costs imposed on hydro operators in terms of lost profits
as well as potential environmental impacts that result from the need to utilize alternative
sources of electricity. Ideally ramping rate regulations would be determined through a
careful analysis of all the potential impacts. This chapter contributes to our understanding
of these impacts and the trade offs involved.
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For a prototype hydro dam we modelled the lost profits for a range of ramping restric-
tions over a five day period. We present results for a typical day once a steady state has
been obtained. We find that profits are significantly affected (by about 8%) in the case of
the most severe ramping constraints. However we also find a range of less severe ramping
constraints for which profits are impacted by less than 3%. We examine the change in
total hydro production, as well as the purchase of replacement power that results from the
restrictions. One counter intuitive result is that total hydro production increases as a result
of the ramping constraints. This result follows from the desire of the hydro operator to
mitigate the effect of the ramping constraints by producing more power in off-peak periods
and in our example resulted in an increase in the average water level in the dam over a
24 hour period. Our assumption is that the increase in hydro production will result in
reduced thermal generation in the economy, which causes an environmental benefit from
reduced air pollution emissions. We calculate a net cost of the ramping restrictions as the
lost profits net of any environmental benefit of reduced air pollution. This net cost can be
compared to expected environmental benefits from an improved aquatic ecosystem.
An important conclusion of the chapter is that ramping restrictions should not be
determined in isolation, but rather using a cost-benefit approach that evaluates the trade
offs involved. This chapter has identified some of the important trade offs that should be
examined more carefully in future research. These include the impact on hydro operator
profits as well as the environmental impact of a change in the intensity of use of other
types of power.
There are several directions for further research. First, we could account for uncertainty
in demand, water inflow and electricity prices through a stochastic dynamic optimization
model assuming these uncertain variables can be modelled as known stochastic processes.
Second, more realistic, but sophisticated hydro power production functions could be used
and the provision of ancillary services such as spinning reserve to the electricity market
could be considered. Finally further efforts are needed to construct a measure of the envi-
ronmental benefits for the river ecosystem gained by imposing these ramping restrictions.
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Chapter 3
An Options Pricing Approach to
Ramping Rate Restrictions at Hydro
Power Plants
3.1 Introduction
Electricity demand tends to follow a marked daily pattern, peaking during the daytime
and early evening hours. It is also subject to seasonal spikes to meet demand for air
conditioning in the summer and/or heating in the winter. Electricity cannot be stored and
the typical base load power sources including coal and nuclear are much more limited than
hydro in their ability to vary generation levels. This results in fairly inelastic supply and
consequent volatile electricity prices, particularly in those regions which rely heavily on
fossil fuel and nuclear power. Price spikes and jumps are not uncommon. Figure 3.1 shows
the hourly German EEX spot price from January 1 to July 24, 2006. Hydro operators can
benefit from this volatility by increasing water release rates (ramping up) in response to
high prices and by reducing water release rates (ramping down) in periods of low prices to
let water levels recover in the reservoir.
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Figure 3.1: German EEX Spot Price, January 1-July 24, 2006
Regulators charged with protecting local ecosystems must consider the consequences of
hydro operations for native flora and fish habitat. Restrictions may be imposed on mini-
mum and maximum water levels in reservoirs and rivers, release rates from reservoirs, and
the rate of change in the release rate (ramping rate). Any restrictions on hydro operations
must be considered in light of the impact on profitability for the hydro operator and on
the capability of the electricity grid to meet peak demands. If there is greater reliance on
fossil fuels for peaking requirements, there would be added environmental consequences
resulting from the harmful emissions from coal, natural gas and petroleum1. The optimal
1This issue is addressed in chapter 2 in a model of optimal hydro production with deterministic prices.
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choice of restrictions would balance the consequences for the ecosystem with the lost profits
to hydro operators and the possible impact on the electricity grid.
Intuitively, ramping restrictions should have the largest impact on profits of hydro op-
erations for which the optimal control without restrictions involves frequent ramping up
or down of water release rates. This would be expected in an environment of frequently
changing prices in which hydro operators are motivated to adjust water release rates ac-
cordingly. It follows that in analyzing the impact of ramping rates it is important to pay
particular attention to accurately modelling the dynamics of electricity prices. The jumps
and spikes that are observed in electricity prices make electricity price modelling particu-
larly challenging. The recent literature on electricity price modelling, reviewed in Section
3.2, suggests that regime switching models hold considerable promise.
In the current literature, there are relatively few studies of the costs and associated
benefits of restricting ramping rates at hydro power plants. This chapter contributes to
this literature by studying the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant operations
and profitability using a regime switching model of electricity prices, which we argue pro-
vides a more realistic characterization of electricity prices than other models, such as jump
diffusion, used previously in the literature. Hydro operations are modelled as a stochastic
control problem which results in a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. The ramping
rate for water releases is chosen to maximize the value of the hydro plant. The optimal
control is determined by solving the HJB equation numerically using a fully implicit finite
difference approach with semi-Lagrangian time stepping.2 We examine the impact of a
range of ramping restrictions for a medium-sized prototype hydro plant in Ontario. We
focus on how the impact of ramping restrictions depends on the cost of generating hydro-
electric power and the characteristics of the assumed price process such as the volatility,
probability of regime shift, speed of mean reversion and long run average price. For com-
parison we also examine results for a single price regime case (using the base regime in the
regime switching model as the single regime) to determine how the presence of two price
2See Chen [2008] for a discussion of finite difference schemes based on a semi-Lagrangian method for
solving stochastic optimal control problems.
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regimes affects hydro plant value and optimal operations. The parameters 3 of the regime
switching model are based on estimates from Janczura and Weron [2009].
Our study is limited in that we do not address the environmental gains to the aquatic
ecosystem, nor the environmental costs of alternate thermal power generation. Specifying
these environmental costs and benefits in monetary terms is problematic and beyond the
scope of this research. Rather we seek to examine the other side of the equation - the
costs of these restrictions in terms of lost profitability. Knowledge of these costs will help
illuminate the trade offs involved and inform the design of regulations.
Individual hydro plants are unique in terms of their size, water flows, physical design
and linkages to the grid. Optimal hydro operations depend on electricity market structure,
demand patterns and reliance on different fuel sources. In this chapter we seek to draw
some general conclusions about when the effect of ramping restrictions on hydro profits
will be most severe. To preview our results, for our medium-sized power plant there is a
significant effect on profits for the most restrictive ramping constraints, but we also observe
a range of ramping restrictions over which profits are not substantially affected. There are
differing effects depending on the characteristics of the assumed price process. We find that
ramping restrictions have a larger impact when the expected variation in price is increased
such as through an increase in volatility which make it desirable to change water release
rates relatively frequently. Ramping rates also have a larger impact if the range of likely
prices includes values at which the hydro plant is operating at a loss. These and other
avenues through which ramping restrictions influence profits are explored in depth in this
chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows: in the second section, we provide a brief review
of the related literature; electricity price models for both the jump diffusion and regime
switching cases are presented in section three; section four describes the modelling of hydro
operations; in section five the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation for the regime switching
case is derived; section six describes the prototype hydro plant used in the empirical study
as well as the parameters of the price process; section seven contains the empirical analysis
3We use the estimated parameters by Janczura and Weron [2009] based on the German EEX spot price
since these parameters for the Ontario spot price are not available in the literature.
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of the hydro operation and profit under various ramping restrictions, together with a
comprehensive sensitivity analysis; lastly, conclusions and directions of future research are
given in section eight.
3.2 Related Literature
Early work on the economics of ramping restrictions include Veselka et al. [1995], Edwards
et al. [1999], Harpman [1999] and Edwards [2003], who examine the effect of particular
ramping rate regimes as environmental constraints, but do not provide extensive analysis
of ramping rate restrictions on the power station’s optimal operation and profit. The trade
offs involved in the choice of the optimal ramping rate regime are not addressed in these
papers. In a recent study, Niu and Insley [2013] extend these works by considering both
the associated benefits and costs of ramping restrictions on hydro profits and on total daily
hydro production and the potential implications for other sources of power.
A limitation of these studies is that the optimization models are solved in a deterministic
framework. Uncertain electricity prices as well as water inflows imply that optimal hydro
power operation is best studied in a stochastic framework. Thompson et al. [2004] and
Chen and Forsyth [2008] study the hydro operation and valuation problem in a stochastic
optimal control framework using jump diffusion models for electricity prices. Chen and
Forsyth [2008] also analyze the impact of ramping restrictions on a hydro plant’s value.
In a numerical example they find that imposing the most restrictive ramping constraint
reduces the value of a hypothetical power plant by 37%. The focus of the Chen and Forsyth
[2008] paper is on the efficient solution of the complex stochastic optimization problem.
They do not attempt to determine the best model for electricity prices.
There is a rich literature which addresses the challenges of modelling electricity spot
prices. At the heart of the modelling issues are the inherent properties of electricity which
result in limited transferability over time (storage constraint) and space (transmission
constraint). Key characteristics of electricity prices and loads include strong dependence
on weather and regular daily, weekly, and monthly patterns. Electricity spot prices tend
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to exhibit frequent small jumps and occasionally extreme spikes. They show strong mean
reversion moving rapidly from price spikes to the mean price, and price level and volatility
are highly correlated. Weron [2008] gives a description of these stylized facts.
Weron [2008] provides a good review of the literature on electricity price modelling.
When the objective is derivative pricing and risk management, there are two popular
classes of stochastic processes for electricity prices: mean-reverting jump diffusion models
and mean-reverting Markov regime switching models4. Some examples of jump-diffusion
models include Deng [2000], Geman and Roncoroni [2006], Escribano et al. [2011], Weron
[2008] and Benth et al. [2007]. An issue in using jump diffusion models is how to capture the
return to a more normal price level after a jump. There are various modelling approaches
used in the literature. Chen and Forsyth [2008] in their numerical example model electricity
prices with two jump processes - a positive jump is followed with high probability by a down
jump, bring price back into its normal state. Weron et al. [2004] suggest this represents a
good approximation as spikes typically do not last for more than one day.
It is, however, desirable to be able to capture the situation where price suddenly spikes
upward and then remains in this spike regime for several periods before returning to a more
normal state. This can be observed in the historical data as is shown in Figure 3.2. This
pattern might appear when for some reason the grid cannot respond quickly enough to a
sudden surge in demand or when there is an unanticipated restriction on supply such as
would be caused by grid congestion or an outage in a power station. One way to capture
this phenomenon would be to add more jump terms into a jump diffusion model, but
this would make the parameter estimation and plant valuation quite complex. Another
alternative is the use of Markov regime switching models with base and jump regimes
where there is some positive probability of remaining in the jump regime.
4Another class of model is the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model for electricity prices. Recent work
includes Rambharat et al. [2005] who incorporate an exogenous variable (temperature) in the proposed
TAR model. However, Misiorek et al. [2006] argue that the spot electricity price depends on both fun-
damentals (such as loads and network constraints) and other psychological and sociological factors which
are unquantifiable. They state that “the Markov regime-switching (or simply regime-switching) models,
where the regime is determined by an unobservable, latent variable, seem interesting.”
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Figure 3.2: German EEX Spot Price, January 9-15, July 17-23, December 18-24, 2006
Early results on Markov regime switching models include Ethier and Mount [1998] who
estimate a two-state switching model with both regimes governed by AR(1) processes.
Huisman and De Jong [2003], Weron et al. [2004] and Bierbrauer et al. [2007] make exten-
sions by proposing an independent spike two-regime model using different distributional
assumptions for the spike regime. De Jong [2006] modifies the spike regime by using an
autoregressive process with Poisson jumps. Further extensions are given by Mount et al.
[2006] who allow transition probabilities to depend on the reserve margin and Huisman
[2008] who suggests temperature dependent transition probabilities. In two recent stud-
ies, Janczura and Weron [2009, 2010] introduce median-shifted spike regime distributions
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with heteroskedastic dynamics for the base regime. An overview of the development on
alternative regime switching models can be found in Janczura and Weron [2010]. Some ap-
plications of regime switching models in the valuation of physical assets include Chen and
Forsyth [2010] for natural gas storage valuation, Heydari and Siddiqui [2010] for valuing a
gas-fired power plant and Chen and Insley [2012] for optimal forest harvesting problem.
One common practice with the study of electricity price dynamics is that daily average
log-prices, instead of hourly prices, are used to estimate the chosen models partially because
they are better suited to certain distributions and the estimated parameters have robust
statistical properties. However, this may be problematic for derivative pricing and risk
management since optimal decisions such as power plant operations are made on an hourly
or half hourly basis according to spot electricity prices and demand.
3.3 Electricity Price Models
Both jump diffusion and regime switching models have been used in the literature to
model electricity prices. Chen and Forsyth [2008] and Thompson et al. [2004] employ
jump diffusion models as shown in Equation (3.1).
dP = µ(P, t)dt+ σ(P, t)dW +
N∑
ς=1
ψς(P, t, Jς)dqς . (3.1)
where
• µ(P, t) is the generalized drift;
• σ(P, t) is the generalized volatility;
• dW is the increment of the standard Gauss-Wiener process;
• ψς(P, t, Jς)’s are any arbitrary functions of price and/or time;
• Jς ’s are drawn from some arbitrary distributions Gς(J);
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• dqς ’s are Poisson processes with
dqς =
{
1 with probability ς(P, t)dt
0 with probability 1− ς(P, t)dt
Over the time interval dt, ς(P, t)dt is the probability of dqς = 1, i.e., the price jumps
from P to P +ψς(P, t, Jς). Here ψς(P, t, Jς) determines the jump size of a particular jump,
where J is a random variable. The number of Poisson processes N is arbitrary. In both
Chen and Forsyth [2008] and Thompson et al. [2004] there are assumed to be two types of
jumps, an upward jump and a downward jump. A threshold, P¯ , was specified so that any
price above the threshold was assumed to have arrived there as a result of an up-jump.
A seasonal component is included in the drift term. Parameters are chosen by Thompson
et al. [2004] so that resulting price simulations appear to be a reasonable depiction of
electricity prices. Chen and Forsyth [2008] adopt the same parameter values. Note that
the parameter values are assumed to reflect risk adjusted parameters under the Q measure.
The regime switching price model defines N specific regimes and a different price pro-
cess may be specified for each regime. The transition between regimes is controlled by
a continuous-time Markov chain. A general specification of a regime switching process is
given in Equation (3.2) below.
dP = µı(P, t)dt+ σı(P, t)dZ +
N∑
=1
P (ξı − 1)dXı, ı = 1, ..., N. (3.2)
where
• µı(P, t) is the generalized drift in state ı;
• σı(P, t) is the generalized volatility in state ı;
• dZ is the increment of the standard Gauss-Wiener process;
• ξı is the jump size from state ı to state ;
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• dXı indicates the transition of the Markov chain from state ı to state ;
Let qı be the transition intensity of the Markov chain from state ı to state . Then over
an instant dt, we have
dXı =
{
1 with probability qıdt
0 with probability 1− qıdt
Over the time interval dt, qıdt is the probability of dXı = 1, i.e., the price jumps from P
in regime ı to Pξı in regime . The number of states N is often chosen arbitrarily for ease
of computation, and is set equal to 2 in our empirical study.
Note that in the regime switching model the drift and diffusion terms are specific to
the particular regime, indexed by superscript ı. When a regime change occurs, the price
jumps from P in regime ı to Pξı in regime  and both the drift function and volatility
function will change from µı(P, t) and σı(P, t) to µ(P, t) and σ(P, t). This contrasts with
the common jump diffusion model in which a jump in price does not imply a change in
drift and volatility terms. The regime switching model could approximate a jump diffusion
model if many different regimes are assumed, and each regime involves a different jump
size.
There is no general agreement in the literature as to which model is best able to describe
the characteristics of electricity prices. This is an empirical question and the answer will
be case specific, depending on the nature of a given electricity market. In this chapter we
adopt a regime switching model based on a statistical estimation done by Janczura and
Weron [2009] for German EEX spot prices.
3.4 Modelling Optimal Hydro Operations
3.4.1 Physical and Environmental Constraints
A typical hydro power plant is operated under certain physical and environmental con-
straints including minimum and maximum water release rates, maximum and minimum
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water content in the reservoir, and possibly ramping constraints. We specify similar con-
straints as in Niu and Insley [2013]. The minimum and maximum water release rate
requirements can be represented as
rmin≤r≤rmax (3.3)
where r is the water release rate. Reservoir storage constraints can be stated as
wmin≤w≤wmax (3.4)
where w represents the water content. The equation of motion for water is governed by
the following formula:
dw = a(`− r)dt (3.5)
where a converts water flow rate to the same unit as the water content. Water inflow
rates are stochastic in nature. In order to focus on the stochastic feature of electricity
prices and the impact of ramping restrictions on the valuation and optimal operation of
the hydro power plant, we assume that the inflow rate ` is a positive constant. This
simplified assumption is realistic for a short period of time such as the single week used
in the empirical analysis in Section 3.6. An extension of this chapter would be to model
` by a stochastic differential equation. To prevent the water content falling below wmin
or increasing above wmax, we follow the approach of Chen and Forsyth [2008] using an
augmented equation of motion:
dw = H(r, w)a(`− r)dt. (3.6)
for any w ∈ [wmin, wmax] and r ∈ [rmin, rmax], where H is a smooth function of w and r
satisfying
H(r, w)→ 0 if r > ` and w→wmin,
H(r, w)→ 0 if r < ` and w→wmax,
H(r, w) = 1 otherwise. (3.7)
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In order to satisfy Equation (3.7) it is assumed that function H(r, w) has the following
properties:
H(r, w) = O((w − wmin)ν) if r > ` and w→wmin,
H(r, w) = O((wmax − w)ν) if r < ` and w→wmax,
H(r, w) = 1 otherwise (3.8)
where ν could take any small positive constant value.
The ramping control variable z is defined in the following equation:
dr = zdt. (3.9)
The ramping rate z needs to satisfy the following conditions
z≥0 if r = rmin.
z≤0 if r = rmax. (3.10)
to avoid the water release rate from increasing above the maximum releasing rate or de-
creasing below the minimum releasing rate. As in Chen and Forsyth [2008], in order to
satisfy conditions in (3.10) we will require that
min{z} = O((r − rmin)θ) if r→rmin,
max{z} = O((rmax − r)θ) if r→rmax, (3.11)
where θ could take any small positive constant value. In addition, the up-ramping and
down-ramping constraints can be expressed as
dr ≤ rudt. (3.12)
− dr ≤ rddt. (3.13)
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where ru and rd represent the maximum allowed up-ramping and down-ramping rates
respectively. We rewrite these two equations as
− rddt ≤ dr ≤ rudt. (3.14)
which is
− rd ≤ z ≤ ru. (3.15)
Let Z(r) denote the set of admissible controls that satisfy constraint (3.15) and conditions
(3.11). This gives Z(r) ⊆ [zmin, zmax].
3.4.2 The Optimization Problem
The present value of net revenue from power generation from t = t1 to t = T is given by
the following equation ∫ T
t1
e−ρtq(r, h(w))(P − c)dt. (3.16)
where ρ is the discount rate, q is the amount of power produced which is a function of the
water release rate r and the head h, and c is the unit cost of hydro power production, which
is assumed to be a positive constant. Therefore, q(r, h(w))(P−c) is the instantaneous profit
for the hydro power plant. The objective is to maximize Equation (3.16) subject to the
set of physical and environmental constraints for a hydro power plant described in Section
3.4.1. Let V ı(P,w, r, t1) denote the value of the hydro plant under the optimal control in
regime ı with the risk adjusted (or risk neutral) measure.
V ı(P,w, r, t1) = max
z
EQ
[ ∫ T
t1
e−ρ(t−t1)H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c)dt
]
. (3.17)
subject to
Z(r) ⊆ [zmin, zmax]. (3.18)
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dw = H(r, w)a(`− r)dt. (3.19)
dr = zdt. (3.20)
dP = µı(P, t)dt+ σı(P, t)dZ +
N∑
=1
P (ξı − 1)dXı. (3.21)
where H is a penalty function on profits given by Equation (3.7), so that the profit de-
creases to zero as r > ` and w→wmin or r < ` and w→wmax, and otherwise remains at
H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c). Z(r) specifies the set of admissible controls. In addition, the
electricity price, P , follows Equation (3.21) which is assumed to be a risk adjusted speci-
fication. The transition equations governing water balance and water release are specified
in Equations (3.19) and (3.20) respectively. Note that constraints (3.3) and (3.14) are
incorporated into (3.18) and constraint (3.4) is incorporated into (3.17) and (3.19).
3.5 Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equations
3.5.1 HJB-PDE for the Regime Switching Model
Following Kennedy [2007], we use the standard hedging approach in options pricing to
derive the HJB-PDE (Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Partial Differential Equation) for the value
of the hydro power station (Appendix A.1.1). Under the risk adjusted measure5 the value
of the hydro plant in regime ı satisfies the following equation
5The hydro plant valuation with the regime switching model for electricity prices is associated with
the regime switching risk, therefore the market is not complete. This indicates that there is no unique
equivalent martingale measure that allows us to move from the physical measure to the risk adjusted
measure. Forsyth and Vetzal [2014] discuss that one way to pin down the measure for pricing is to use
an expanded set of hedging instruments. Then the risk-neutral transition intensity could be uniquely
determined by the prices of these instruments. Our derivation for the HJB-PDE follows this method.
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r¯V ı = sup
z∈Z(r)
(z
∂V ı
∂r
) +H(r, w)a(`− r)∂V
ı
∂w
+
1
2
(σı)2(P, t)
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+ (µı(P, t)− Λıσı(P, t))∂V
ı
∂P
+H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c) + ∂V
ı
∂t
+
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı(V
 − V ı).
(3.22)
where r¯ is the risk free interest rate, Λı is the market price of risk in state ı and λQı is the
risk-neutral transition intensity from state ı to  ( 6= ı). The electricity price given by
Equation (3.2) is used to derive Equation (3.22).
The HJB-PDE can be interpreted as a no-arbitrage condition. In the risk neutral
world the return on the asset must equal the risk free rate, r¯. On the right hand side of
the equation we see all the sources of return on the asset which, from left to right, include
changes due to the optimal choice of the ramping rate, z; changes due to water inflows and
releases which affect the water content, w; changes due to first and second order effects of
electricity price variation, P ; cash flow from electricity sales; changes in V with time; and
lastly the effect on value of the risk of a price regime change.
The domain for Equation (3.22) is (P,w, r) ∈ [0,∞] × [wmin, wmax] × [rmin, rmax]. The
numerical solution is computed in a finite domain: (P,w, r) ∈ [0, Pmax] × [wmin, wmax] ×
[rmin, rmax]. Equation (3.22) is solved backwards in time from t = T to t = t1. It is
convenient to define τ = T − t as the time remaining in the life of the asset. Equation
(3.22) can be rewritten in terms of τ as follows:
∂V ı
∂τ
= CV ı+BV ı+ sup
z∈Z(r)
(z
∂V ı
∂r
)+H(r, w)a(`−r)∂V
ı
∂w
+H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P −c). (3.23)
where the operators C and B are given by
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CV ı =
1
2
(σı)2(P, t)
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+ (µı(P, t)− Λıσı(P, t))∂V
ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
BV ı =
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQıV
.
We specify a functional form of the electricity price as in Chen and Forsyth [2008] for
both the drift and diffusion terms and assume µı(P, t) = αı(K ı − P ), σı(P, t) = σıP . Now
CV ı is written as
CV ı =
1
2
(σı)2P 2
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+ [αı(K ı − P )− ΛıσıP ]∂V
ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
A numerical approach is required to solve this non-linear HJB-PDE. We will use a
fully implicit finite difference scheme with semi-Lagrangian time stepping. This numerical
approach converges to the viscosity solution of the HJB equation as is shown in Chen and
Forsyth [2007, 2008]. Details on the numerical algorithms for solving Equation (3.23) are
given in A.1.2.
3.5.2 Boundary Conditions
Boundary conditions are required to fully specify the optimization problem. For the ter-
minal boundary condition at t = T (i.e. τ = 0), we assume the value of the asset is zero,
which is a common assumption in the literature. (See Thompson et al. [2004] for example.)
V ı(P,w, r, τ = 0) = 0. (3.24)
It can be shown that the solution of Equation (3.23) does not require information out-
side of the domains of w and r and hence no special boundary conditions are required.
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At wmin, wmax, rmin, rmax, we simply solve the PDE along the corresponding boundaries.6
However, the computational domain of the price could differ for any two different regimes.
Taking the limit of the PDE equation as P→0, we obtain the boundary PDE for
ı = 1, 2, . . . , N .
∂V ı
∂τ
= C0V
ı+BV ı+ sup
z∈Z(r)
(z
∂V ı
∂r
)+H(r, w)a(`−r)∂V
ı
∂w
−H(r, w)q(r, h(w))c;P→0 (3.25)
where the operator B is the same as above and C0 is given by
C0V
ı = αıK ı
∂V ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
For P→∞, we apply the commonly used boundary condition V ıPP = 0 (Wilmott [1998]),
which implies that
V ı'x(w, r, τ)P + y(w, r, τ).
The boundary PDE now is written as
∂V ı
∂τ
= C1V
ı+BV ı+ sup
z∈Z(r)
(z
∂V ı
∂r
)+H(r, w)a(`−r)∂V
ı
∂w
+H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P−c);P = Pmax
(3.26)
where the operators C1 is given by
C1V
ı = [αı(K ı − P )− ΛıσıP ]∂V
ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
We solve the PDE in the region P ∈ (0, Pmax). At the boundaries we solve PDE (3.25) at
6See Chen and Forsyth [2008] for more details.
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P = 0 and PDE (3.26) at P = Pmax.
3.6 Specification of the Empirical Example
3.6.1 Description of the Hydro Plant
The empirical analysis in this study is done for a medium-sized hydro plant similar to
the Abitibi Canyon generating station in north eastern Ontario owned by Ontario Power
Generation. This station has a generation capacity of 336 MW. For comparison the Sir
Adam Beck I and II generating stations at Niagara Falls have capacities of about 500 MW
and 1,500 MW respectively and the Donze`re-Mondragon Dam in France has an installed
capacity of 354 MW. The combined physical capacity (CPC) of the generators at the
Abitibi Canyon station is about 19 thousand Cubic-feet-per-second (CFS) and the storage
capacity of the reservoir is about 17 thousand acre-feet.7
The analysis is conducted for a time horizon of one week8 which is a sufficient time
scale for the questions addressed in this chapter. We abstract from the natural variations in
water inflow and assume a constant inflow of 6,671 CFS,9 which is the average hourly inflow
rate based on data for the historical water inflow for the hydro station from 01 January
2001 to 30 November 2006. As noted earlier this assumption is considered realistic for
the short time horizon we are using. A stochastic mean reverting diffusion water inflow
process could be incorporated into this empirical study, which however would add another
dimension to the HJB-PDE. The cost of generating hydroelectric power is assumed constant
at 20 EUR/MWh for the hydro station.
7Detailed descriptions of the generating station can be found in Statistics Canada [2000], Hendry and
Chang [2001], and http://www.opg.com/power/hydro/northeast plant group/abitibi.asp.
8In two similar studies, the time horizon is 15 days in Thompson et al. [2004] and one week in Chen
and Forsyth [2008]. For the empirical studies in this chapter, the computational time varies with the level
of ramping restrictions and takes from less than a day to one week.
9This only represents the average case in our sample period. The analysis for a specific season (wet or
dry period) could be easily conducted by calculating the average hourly inflow rate in that period.
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We use a standard hydro power production function from the power engineering liter-
ature. The amount of electricity produced can be represented by
q(r, w) ∝ r × h(r, w)× e(r, h). (3.27)
where q is the power output, r is the water release rate, h is the gross head, w is the
water content, e is the efficiency factor and ∝ means proportion. Under some simplifying
assumptions about its functional form from Niu and Insley [2013], the following production
function is used in our empirical analysis
q(r, h(w)) = 0.001× g × r × h(w)× e
= 0.28× r × h(w) (3.28)
where g is the gravitational constant (32.15 feet-per-square-second) and the factor 0.001
converts q to MW from KW, r is in CFS and h is in feet. The efficiency factor is assumed
constant at 0.87. We use a linear functional form between the head and water content in
the reservoir, represented by
h(w) = b× w (3.29)
where w is the water content in acre-feet and b is assumed to be 0.0089.
In the empirical analysis, the operational and environmental constraints and their as-
sociated values for the base case are specified as
• Up-ramping and down-ramping constraints are 3,000 Cubic-feet-per-second per hour
(CFS-hr);
• The minimum water release requirement is 2,000 CFS and the maximum release
constraint is 15,000 CFS;
• The minimum water content requirement is 7,000 acre-feet and the maximum value
is 17,000 acre-feet;
These are similar to the cases examined in Niu and Insley [2013]. The input parameters
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values for the Abitibi Canyon Station
Parameter Value Parameter Value
` 6671 CFS wmax 17000 acre-feet
g 32.15 feet/square-second wmin 7000 acre-feet
ρ 1000 kg/cubic-meter rmax 15000 CFS
b 0.0089 rmin 2000 CFS
e 0.87 qmax 336 MW
CPC 19000 CFS qmin 0 MW
− − ru 3000 CFS-hr
− − rd 3000 CFS-hr
for the hydro power production and hydro dam specifications are reported in Table 3.1.
3.6.2 Specification of the Regime Switching Price Process
We base our Markov regime switching model on the model estimated in Janczura and
Weron [2009], which is parsimonious and can capture pertinent characteristics for electricity
price dynamics. They use the German EEX spot price from 2001-2009 to estimate the
following model10
dP = η(µ1 − P )dt+ σ1
√
PdZ. (3.30)
log(P −m) ∼ N(µ2, σ22), P > m. (3.31)
where the base regime is the CIR (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross) process and the spike regime is
the shifted lognormal distribution (with higher mean and variance than those in the base
regime) which assigns zero probability to prices below the median m. Introducing het-
eroskedasticity through the CIR square root process accounts for the fact that electricity
price volatility generally increases with price level, because positive price shocks tend to
increase volatility more than negative shocks. The shifted spike regime distribution (log-
normal) is used in order to correctly separate spikes from the ‘normal’ price behavior.
Their empirical study shows that these specifications are more realistic for electricity spot
10Janczura and Weron [2009] estimate the Markov regime switching models with shifted lognormal or
Pareto spikes and Vasicek or CIR base regimes. The test results for the base regime show that the CIR
specification is more suitable than the Vasicek specification and the p-values for the spike regime indicate
that the lognormal distribution gives a better fit compared to the Pareto spike distribution.
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Table 3.2: Parameter Values Estimated by Janczura and Weron [2009]
Parameter Value
µ1 47.194 EUR/MWh
µ2 3.44
η 0.36
σ1 0.73485
σ2 0.83066
m 46.54 EUR/MWh
λ12 0.0089
λ21 0.8402
Base regime: dP = η(µ1 − P )dt+ σ1
√
PdZ
Spike regime: log(P −m) ∼ N(µ2, σ22), P > m.
prices and lead to better spike identification and goodness-of-fit than in the standard mean-
reverting Markov regime switching models (i.e. the Vasicek or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process)
with constant volatility dynamics.
Janczura and Weron [2009] obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
of Equations (3.30) and (3.31) using the algorithm of Kim [1994]. The mean daily EEX
spot price data is first deseasonalized by removing a long run seasonal trend representing
changing climate and consumptions conditions during the year and long-term non-periodic
structural changes. In addition a weekly periodic component is removed. Table 3.2 shows
the parameter estimates obtained from Janczura and Weron [2009] for the 2001 to 2005
period of their sample. Note that since the estimation is done using daily data, the pa-
rameters can be interpreted using a daily time scale.
The model specified in Equations (3.30) and (3.31) is different than that shown in
Equation (3.2). In particular the spike regime is not modelled as an Itoˆ process. We
adapt the Janczura and Weron [2009] model to conform to standard Itoˆ processes in both
regimes so that it can be incorporated into the HJB equation describing optimal hydro
dam operation. Specifically it is assumed the regime switching process can be specified as
follows for the base and spike regimes respectively:
dP = η(µ1 − P )dt+ σ1
√
PdZ + P (ξ12 − 1)dX12. (3.32)
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dP = σ2(P −m)dz + P (ξ21 − 1)dX21, P > m. (3.33)
The P-measure transition intensities are as defined in Equation (3.2).
Note that Equations (3.32) and (3.33) also include terms at the end which specify the
jump in price level when a regime change happens. The spike regime is only defined for
prices above the median, m. It was thus necessary to assume that when a change in regime
happens from the base to the spike regime there will be a jump up in price level, with the
jump size reflecting the ratio of the long run expected values in the base and spike regimes.
When a transition from the spike to the base regime occurs, a jump down in price will
occur at level of equal but opposite magnitude.
The parameters in Table 3.2 are estimated under the P measure (physical measure).
To derive the option value using the hedging approach as shown in Appendix A.1.1, we
require the market price of risk to convert the P measure to the Q measure. Under the Q
measure Equations (3.32) and (3.33) becomes
dP = [η(µ1 − P )− Λ1σ1
√
P ]dt+ σ1
√
PdZˆ + P (ξ12 − 1)dXˆ12. (3.34)
dP = σ2(P −m)dzˆ + P (ξ21 − 1)dXˆ21, P > m. (3.35)
where dZˆ and dzˆ are the increment of the standard Gauss-Wiener processes under the Q
measure specified by the choice of Λ1 and Λ2 respectively. dXˆ12 and dXˆ21 indicate the
transition of the Markov chain under the Q measure. In this empirical study we rely on
existing studies of the market price of risk to convert the drift from the physical measure to
the risk neutral measure. However, as there are no current studies converting P-measure
transition probabilities to Q-measure probabilities11, sensitivity analysis is employed to
investigate the impact of changing transition probabilities.
The parameter values adopted for Equations (3.34) and (3.35) are shown in Table 3.3.
The long run price, µ1, median price, m, mean reversion speed, η, and volatilities σ1 and
σ2 are taken from the Janczura and Weron estimates given in Table 3.2. One problem with
11In practice, Q-measure probabilities can be calibrated to the observed prices of traded options for
electricity prices.
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Table 3.3: Parameter Values for the Regime Switching Model
Parameter Value Parameter Value
µ1 47.194 EUR/MWh η 0.36
m 46.54 EUR/MWh c 20 EUR/MWh
σ1 0.73485 σ2 0.83066
ξ12 1.6470 ξ21 0.6072
λQ12 0.0089 λ
Q
21 0.8402
Λ1 -0.2481 Λ2 -0.2481
Pmax1 200 EUR/MWh P
max
2 200 EUR/MWh
Pmin1 0 EUR/MWh P
min
2 48 EUR/MWh
T 168h r¯ 0.05 annually
Base regime: dP = [η(µ1 − P )− Λ1σ1
√
P ]dt+ σ1
√
PdZˆ + P (ξ12 − 1)dXˆ12.
Spike regime: dP = σ2(P −m)dzˆ + P (ξ21 − 1)dXˆ21, P > m.
using these estimates is that our empirical analysis involves hourly control of the ramping
rate. However the parameters from Janczura and Weron [2009] are estimated with mean
daily data. Use of daily averages in this context is clearly not ideal. Any regular daily
patterns are ignored. The chapter undertakes sensitivities to investigate the impact of
these parameter estimates. Estimating parameter values on an hourly basis will be a topic
for future research.
As noted above ξ12 is set equal to the ratio of the spike regime mean price to the base
regime mean price. ξ21 is roughly the inverse of ξ12. So, on average ξ21× ξ12 is around 1 to
avoid arbitrage opportunities. λQ12 and λ
Q
21 represent the regime transition intensities in the
risk neutral world. The risk adjusted probability of switching from regime ı to regime j is
λQijdt. As expected the probability of remaining in the base regime over a single day is very
high, so that the spike regime occurs quite rarely. As was noted earlier, these estimated
transition probabilities12 from Janczura and Weron [2009] are under the P-measure and
we use them as the risk neutral transition probabilities in our empirical study, which is
problematic. However, in the sensitivity analysis we will check the robustness of our results
by assuming different transition probabilities.
12In the literature, constant transition probabilities are usually estimated and used for derivative pricing
and risk management. However, this specification may not be appropriate in our asset pricing model as
the transition probability for electricity prices should not be constant, but depends on some observable
variables such as the demand level.
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Another important parameter is the market price of risk Λ, representing the excess
return over the risk-free rate that the market expects for taking extra risks. The empirical
evidence for the market price of risk in the power markets are mixed in terms of the
magnitude, variability and sign which could be positive or negative. It generally varies
over time and across markets. Some of the empirical estimations are provided by Lucia
and Schwartz [2002], Cartea and Figueroa [2005], Kolos and Ronn [2008] and Weron [2008].
In Weron [2008] the market prices of risk implied from AEO-GB0300 Asian-style options
and GB0300 futures ranges from -0.2 to 0.1 during the period November 1, 1999 - January
28, 2000. In this chapter we assume the market price of risk is a deterministic constant13
and use the estimated value from Cartea and Figueroa [2005], where they use historical spot
data and forward data from the England and Wales electricity market and find the market
price of risk is -0.2481. As Weron [2008] explains “negative value is a higher incentive for
hedging on the demand side relative to the supply side, because of the non-storability of
electricity as compared to the (limited and costly but still existent) storage capabilities of
fuel”.
Table 3.3 also shows the assumed variable cost of electricity production, c, the upper
and lower limits on price in the numerical analysis, Pminı and P
max
ı , ı = 1, 2, the timeframe
for the analysis in hours, T , and the risk free rate, r¯.
3.7 Empirical Results
3.7.1 Base Case
In this section, we present the numerical results for the base case with ramping constraints
at 3,000 CFS-hr. The value of the hydro power station is a function of electricity price,
water content, release rate, time and regime. We are interested in how these variables
will affect the profit and operation of the power plant under various levels of ramping
restrictions. Due to the high dimensionality of the value function, we can only analyze the
13We could specify the market price of risk that is a linear or nonlinear function of the state variables.
Then the estimated time-varying market price of risk could be incorporated into the HJB-PDE.
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results by looking at various combinations of the variables while holding other variables
constant. So, given any ramping restrictions, for the numerical results we will focus on the
following relationships: power plant value versus price and release rate; optimal ramping
rate versus price and release rate; optimal ramping rate versus price and time; power plant
value versus price and reservoir level; optimal ramping rate versus price and reservoir level.
Figures 3.3(a) through 3.7(b) show the results for this regime switching case when the
constraints for ramping rate, water release rate and water content are imposed. Figures
3.3(a) and 3.3(b) plot the value of the hydro power plant as a function of water release
rate and spot price at time zero for the base regime and the spike regime respectively when
the reservoir level is at the full capacity and the inflow rate is at 6,671 CFS. Note that the
spike regime is only defined for prices above 46.54 EUR/MWh while the base regime is
defined over the complete range shown from 0 to 200 EUR/MWh. In the base regime we
observe that the value of the hydro power plant is increasing with the spot price. However,
the hydro power plant’s value is increasing with the water release rate for prices above
the marginal cost of electricity generation of 20 EUR/MWh and decreasing with the water
release rate for prices below the marginal cost of electricity generation. This is due to the
fact that the power plant makes losses by generating power when the spot price moves
below the marginal cost. But in the spike regime the value of the hydro power plant is
increasing with both water release rate and spot price. Not surprisingly, at any given water
release rate and spot price, the value of the hydro power plant in the spike regime is higher
than its value in the base regime. More specifically, in the base regime the value reaches
the maximum of EUR 1,541,400 when the current release rate is 15,000 CFS and the price
is 200 EUR/MWh and its value reaches the minimum of EUR 1,282,100 when the current
release rate is 15,000 CFS and the price is 0 EUR/MWh. Even at a price of 0 EUR/MWh
the power plant’s value is still positive due to the fact that the price will move up at a
later time and generate positive profits. Similarly, in the spike regime the value reaches
the maximum of EUR 1,580,300 when the current release rate is 15,000 CFS and the price
is 200 EUR/MWh and its value reaches the minimum of EUR 1,340,900 when the current
release rate is 2,000 CFS and the price is 48 EUR/MWh.
Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) show the optimal control strategies corresponding to Figures
76
3.3(a) and 3.3(b) respectively. In general, for the base regime the power plant will ramp
up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr to generate more power and make higher profits
if the price is high and ramp down at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr to accumulate
more water in the reservoir for generation at later time if the price is low. However the
constraints on release rates and reservoir size also have an impact on optimal operations,
leading to some complex interactions. In Figure 3.4(a) four regions have been labelled. For
example, I denotes a region where the release rate is high but prices are low. The optimal
action is to ramp down at the maximum rate of 3,000 CFS-hr. This tells us that the high
release rate is non-optimal at these low prices, and ramping down allows the reservoir to
replenish. In Region II prices are low and the release rate is at or near the minimum. The
operator must ramp up to avoid violating the minimum release constraint. However as the
release rate is increased, but remaining at low prices we see a switch in the optimal action
from ramping up to ramping down. In general, ramping down is preferable when prices
are low whenever it is possible, given other constraints. Region III shows an area of high
prices and low release rates, and it makes sense that the optimal action is to ramp up.
Finally Region IV indicates an area which has a high release rate and high prices as well.
The constraint on the maximum release rate prevents ramping up at the maximum rate
in this region. For the spike regime, since the price is much higher the power station will
ramp up at 3,000 CFS-hr whenever possible given the other constraints. If we truncate
Figure 3.4(a) for prices below 48 EUR/MWh, the optimal control strategies for the base
regime and the spike regime are very similar, except the controls in the low price and high
release rate region where the boundaries for ramping up and ramping down are slightly
different for these two regimes.
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(a) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Spike Regime
Figure 3.3: Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base and Spike Regimes
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the
Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the
Spike Regime
Figure 3.4: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Base and Spike
Regimes
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base
Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Spike
Regime
Figure 3.5: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base and Spike Regimes
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Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) plot the optimal operational strategies for the hydro power
plant as a function of time and spot price for the base regime and the spike regime respec-
tively when the reservoir level is at the full capacity, the water release rate is at 8,500 CFS
which is midway between the upper and lower limits. These diagrams allow a better view
of the impact of price on the optimal strategy and also indicate the effect of imposing a
terminal time of one week. For the base regime we can clearly observe that at lower prices
it is optimal to ramp down and preserve the water in the reservoir, whereas for high prices
it is optimal to ramp up thereby increasing the release rate and power generation. More
specifically, for a typical hour there are four operational regions: the power plant will ramp
down at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr in order to generate less power and keep the
reservoir at full capacity if the price is below 20 EUR/MWh; if the price lies between 20
EUR/MWh and 40 EUR/MWh the station will ramp down at 2,000 CFS-hr; when the
price is between 40 EUR/MWh and 60 EUR/MWh the station will ramp down at 1,500
CFS-hr; as the price moves above 60 EUR/MWh the station will ramp up at the maximum
limit of 3,000 CFS-hr. It may also be observed that the optimal control strategy remains
largely unchanged over time, but behaves quite differently when the time moves close to
the terminal time. Since the terminal boundary condition of zero value is imposed, the
power plant will ramp up at the maximum allowed rate when time is close to the end of
the time horizon. For the spike regime the station will mostly ramp up at the maximum
limit of 3,000 CFS-hr due to higher prices.
Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) plot the value of the hydro power plant as a function of reser-
voir level and spot price at time zero for the base regime and the spike regime respectively
when the release rate is at 8,500 CFS. In both regimes we observe that the value of the
hydro power plant is increasing with both the reservoir level and spot price. At any given
reservoir level and spot price, the value of the hydro power plant in the spike regime is
higher than its value in the base regime. More specifically, in the base regime the value
reaches the maximum of EUR 1,517,400 when the current reservoir level is 17,000 acre-feet
and the price is 200 EUR/MWh and its value reaches the minimum of EUR 1,162,600
when the current reservoir level is 7,000 acre-feet and the price is 0 EUR/MWh. Similarly,
in the spike regime the value reaches the maximum of EUR 1,554,800 when the current
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reservoir level is 17,000 acre-feet and the price is 200 EUR/MWh and its value reaches
the minimum of EUR 1,194,200 when the current reservoir level is 7,000 acre-feet and the
price is 48 EUR/MWh.
Figures 3.7(a) and 3.7(b) show the optimal control strategies corresponding to Figures
3.6(a) and 3.6(b) respectively. For the base regime, in the lower reservoir boundary region
there are two cases. First, if the price is low it is optimal to ramp down at the maximum
limit of 3,000 CFS-hr to let the reservoir accumulate more water. Second, if the price is
high enough it is even optimal to ramp up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr to make
more profits, but this is not sustainable since it tends to violate the lower water content
constraint. However, if the initial water content is anywhere above the minimum water
content region, this will not cause any concerns. In fact, it is never optimal to operate
anywhere close to the lower reservoir boundary since the power plant’s value is positively
related to the water content as shown in Figure 3.6(a). In addition, for any water content
above the lower reservoir boundary there is an operational boundary between up ramping
at maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr and down ramping at maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr.
In the low price and full reservoir region it is optimal to ramp down at rates lower than
the maximum allowed rate to keep the reservoir full. Furthermore, in the low price region,
for any water content below the maximum level the dam will ramp down at the maximum
allowed rate to let the reservoir store more water even though it could make profits at the
current operating mode. For the spike regime, the optimal control strategies are similar to
the base regime for prices above 48 EUR/MWh. We notice that in the high price and lower
reservoir boundary it is also optimal to ramp up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr.
However, because the price will quickly switch back to the base regime in this case the
plant will again ramp down at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr to let the reservoir
accumulate more water and avoid violating the lower water content constraint.
3.7.2 Impact of Changing Ramping Restrictions
In this section, we analyze the implication of the ramping constraints on the value of the
hydro power plant. The impact of these constraints on profits for a range of ramping
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constraints is detailed in Table 3.4, which is represented by Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b)
graphically. Figure 3.8(a) plots the case at half release rate and full reservoir level and
Figure 3.8(b) plots the case at full release rate and full reservoir level. In general, the
more restrictive the constraint the greater is the limitation on the station’s operational
flexibility and the larger the impact on profits. However for this particular example profit
is not highly sensitive to ramping rate restrictions. Under the same conditions, higher
initial electricity price always gives higher present value.
Without ramping restrictions the total profit from providing power in the base regime
is EUR 1,367,600 when the initial price is 40 EUR/MWh, the reservoir level is at the
full capacity, the water release rate is at the upper limit and the inflow rate is at 6,671
CFS. With ramping constraints of 5,000 CFS-hr, the total profit drops to EUR 1,361,400,
representing a 0.5% reduction over the scenario without ramping restrictions. As ramping
rate restrictions are increased profits continue to drop, until at a restriction of 250 CSF-hr,
then the total profit drops to as low as EUR 1,254,100, which is a 8.3% decrease relative to
the scenario without ramping restrictions. The reduction of profit in this most restrictive
scenario is similar to what is reported in Niu and Insley [2013] in a deterministic framework
in which they assume each day is divided into peaking and off peaking regimes. In Niu and
Insley [2013] the value of the hydro operation is reduced by 6.9% under the most severe
ramping restrictions. Keeping other conditions the same, if the initial release rate is half of
the upper limit, then the total profit drops to EUR 1,310,700, which is only a 4.3% decrease
relative to the scenario without ramping restrictions. From Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) we
also observe profits fall proportionately more as ramping restrictions are increased when
ramping rates are already quite restrictive - i.e. for rates of less than 1,000 CFS-hr. Similar
results are obtained under other specifications such as different initial price, water release
rate and regime. It is noticed that even if the price jumps to 160 EUR/MWh in the spike
regime, at the most restrictive ramping constraint of 250 CSF-hr the total profit only drops
5.9% over the scenario without ramping restrictions.
One concern regarding Janczura and Weron [2009]’s estimation is that they model daily
average electricity price, instead of the hourly electricity price. We would expect the daily
price spikes and volatility will be smaller than those values for the hourly price, but the
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Table 3.4: Numerical Results Under Various Ramping Restrictions
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1368900 1364000 1355500 1339800 1310700
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.0 -2.1 -4.3
FF Profit 1367600 1361400 1350700 1318000 1254100
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -3.6 -8.3
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1401100 1395300 1385900 1367500 1337200
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.4 -4.6
FF Profit 1403600 1397700 1387700 1358000 1298800
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -3.2 -7.5
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1517300 1509700 1497400 1467700 1428500
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.3 -5.9
FF Profit 1529600 1524100 1514900 1490300 1449000
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.0 -2.6 -5.3
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
daily mean reverting rate will be higher than the mean reverting rate for the hourly price.
These could cause an under valuation of the hydro power station. In addition, any regular
daily trends are ignored. This shortcoming in the parameter estimates could also affect
the results about the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant’s value and operation.
To check the robustness of our results, it is necessary to conduct a sensitivity analysis.
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(a) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Spike Regime
Figure 3.6: Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base and Spike Regimes
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Spike Regime
Figure 3.7: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base and Spike
Regimes
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Figure 3.8: Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Half Release Rate and Full
Reservoir Level and at Full Release Rate and Full Reservoir Level
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3.7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Due to the large number of parameters for the regime switching electricity price model
(Table 3.3), we only conduct sensitivity analysis for five key parameters of interest: the
speed of mean reversion in the base regime, the transition intensities in each regime, the
volatilities, the long run mean in the base regime, and the cost of generating hydroelectric
power. A sixth sensitivity is conducted to determine the significance of including the spike
regime. In this case the base regime is modelled as a single regime.
For the first sensitivity, the speed of mean reversion is doubled from 0.36 to 0.72. The
results are shown in Table A.1 (Appendix A.2). The impact of ramping restrictions can be
seen to be similar to the benchmark case. Ramping restrictions affect the profits negatively
and profits fall proportionately more as ramping restrictions are increased when ramping
rates are already quite restrictive. However for this higher speed of mean reversion the
value of the hydro plant is lower, and the impact on profits of increasing ramping rates is
slightly smaller. At the most restrictive ramping restrictions of 250 CFS-hr the profit drops
by 7.6% in the worst scenario compared to the case of mean reverting rate at 0.36, where
the profit decreases by 8.3% in the worst scenario. The higher η implies that price stays
closer to the long run mean, which provides less opportunity for the hydro plant owner
to benefit from an upward movement in price by ramping up and selling more power.
Since the motivation to ramp up (or down) will be reduced, ramping restrictions would be
expected to have a smaller impact.
The next sensitivity involves changing the transition probabilities by increasing the
probability that the price is in the jump regime. Specifically, λQ12 is increased from 0.0089
to 0.02 and λQ21 is decreased from 0.8402 to 0.7402 while keeping η at 0.36. The results are
shown in Table A.2 in Appendix A.2. Again, we observe similar patterns for the impact
of ramping restrictions in these two cases. But with the new transition probabilities the
value is uniformly higher and the ramping impact is slightly larger (but at the same order
of magnitude). At the most restrictive ramping restrictions of 250 CFS-hr the profit drops
by 9.5% in the worst scenario compared to the benchmark case where the profit decreases
by 8.3% in the worst scenario. The change in transition probabilities implies more time is
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spent in the spike regime, which as expected increases the value of the power station. But
with a greater likelihood of being in the spike regime, the imposition of ramping restrictions
limiting the ability to respond to higher prices has a larger impact.
For the third sensitivity, the volatilities for both regimes are increased. In the base
regime the volatility, σ1 is increased from 0.73485 to 0.93. In the spike regime σ2 is increased
from 0.83066 to 1.43. The other parameters are kept at benchmark case values. The results
are given in Table A.3 in Appendix A.2. Compared to Table 3.4, we again observe the
same patterns for the impact of ramping restrictions, but the higher volatilities cause two
major changes. First, the value of the hydro plant is uniformly higher. This is consistent
with the standard result on options pricing, i.e. higher volatility is associated with higher
options value. Second, for higher volatilities the impact of ramping restrictions on the
power plant’s value is slightly larger (but at the same order of magnitude). As Table A.3
shows at the most restrictive ramping restrictions of 250 CFS-hr the profit drops by 9.3%
in the worst scenario compared to the case of low volatilities, where the profit decreases
by 8.3% in the worst scenario. This is caused by the fact that a higher volatility results in
more frequent high prices and low prices. So these restrictive ramping restrictions affect
the plant’s ability to capture profits by ramping up or down quickly in response to more
frequent price changes.
For the fourth sensitivity, the long run mean price for the base regime is decreased
from 47.194 EUR/MWh to 27.194 EUR/MWh. The results are reported in Table A.4 in
Appendix A.2. Compared to the benchmark case, we find similar patterns for the impact
of ramping restrictions. However, a 20 EUR/MWh reduction of the base regime mean
price results in a significantly lower value for the power plant. This is caused by the much
smaller net profit under this lower mean price. In addition, for a lower mean price the
impact of ramping restrictions on the power plant’s value is larger. At the most restrictive
ramping restrictions of 250 CFS-hr the profit drops by 13% in the worst scenario compared
to the benchmark case where the profit decreases by 8.3% in the worst scenario. This is
due to the fact that a lower mean price for the base regime increases the probability that
the price falls below the cost of production. So these restrictive ramping restrictions limit
the plant’s ability to avoid negative profit by ramping down quickly in response to more
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frequent low prices.
For the fifth sensitivity, the cost of generating hydroelectric power is halved from 20
EUR/MWh to 10 EUR/MWh. The results are given in Table A.5 in Appendix A.2. The
impact of ramping restrictions is very similar to the benchmark case. However for this lower
cost of production the value of the hydro plant is significantly higher, and the impact on
profits of increasing ramping rates is slightly smaller. At the most restrictive ramping
restrictions of 250 CFS-hr the profit drops by 7.6% in the worst scenario compared to the
case with cost at 20 EUR/MWh, where the profit decreases by 8.3% in the worst scenario.
A lower production cost means a higher net profit and higher power plant value. Since
this lower cost also reduces the likelihood of negative profit, ramping restrictions would be
expected to have a smaller impact.
In the empirical study above, we examine 6 cases: the benchmark case (Table 3.4)
and 5 cases (Tables A.1 through A.5) from the sensitivity analysis. The results for the
sensitivity analysis are also summarized in Table A.6 (Appendix A.2). The results show
that ramping rates will have a larger effect when the price process is one in which more
frequent ramping up or down is desirable - such as with higher volatilities or more frequent
price spikes. In the empirical example in this chapter, price is mostly above the variable
cost of producing power. This is why ramping restrictions do not have an overly severe
effect on profits even at the most restrictive level. If the price process were such that price
fell below cost frequently, then we expect that ramping restrictions would have a much
more noticeable effect since the hydro operator would be unable to quickly respond to the
low price by ramping down in order to decrease power supply.
In the final sensitivity the base regime is adopted as a single regime. This is done to
determine the importance of the spike regime to the value and optimal operations of the
hydro plant. The results are shown in Tables A.7, A.8, A.9, and A.10 in Appendix A.2.
As expected, the single regime case gives an overall lower value than the two regime case.
However the results are surprisingly close, differing only by 2 to 3 percent. In addition in
the single regime case, ramping restrictions have a smaller impact than in the two regime
case. However the change is again quite small, with the most severe restrictions reducing
profits by 7.5 % in the single regime case compared to 8.3 % in the two regime case.
90
Restrictive ramping constraints will limit the power plant’s ability to make profits during
price spikes, therefore the power plant’s value is more severely affected when the spike
regime is included. However, price spikes are still rare events. In addition if the hydro
plant is already operating at full capacity when a spike occurs, no ramping is needed for
the plant to capture the extra profits from the price spike.
These and other additional numerical experiments show that the ramping effect is
largely determined by the level of the price relative to the cost of generation, i.e., how
long and how frequent the price is close to or lower than the cost of hydro power, and is
less sensitive to the price jumps. In other words, in Janczura and Weron [2009] where the
electricity price is almost surely higher than the cost of power generation, the results show
that the effect of ramping restrictions on the power plant’s ability to gain the profit in the
spike regime is minimal. This is because the hydro operation will be optimally operating
somewhere close to the maximum release rate most of the time. Even though the price
jumps frequently, it is still a rare event compared to the base regime. In Janczura and
Weron [2009] the unconditional probability of the spike regime is as low as 0.0104.
This exercise emphasizes the importance of accurately modelling electricity prices in
order to obtain an accurate estimation of the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro
station’s value and operation. However, overall the results are quite robust and we can
draw some general conclusions based on this sensitivity analysis. In the empirical example,
it has been found that profits are significantly affected (by less than 10%) in the case of
the most severe ramping constraints. However we also find a range of less severe ramping
constraints for which profits are impacted by less than 3%.
3.8 Conclusions
The accurate modelling of electricity prices is still a topic of considerable debate in the
literature. Markov regime switching models are becoming more popular as a means of
capturing in a parsimonious manner the major characteristics of electricity prices such as
price spikes. This chapter contributes to the literature by demonstrating the effect of using
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a regime switching model to analyze ramping rate issues in a prototype hydro power plant.
For a prototype hydro dam we valued the power plant and modelled the lost profits
for a range of ramping restrictions for the regime switching model over a one week period.
In most scenarios the optimal control is of a “bang-bang” type, i.e., ramping up at the
upper limit when prices are high and ramping down at the upper limit when prices are
low. The exception to this is when the dam is up against one of the other constraints such
as maximum/minimum release rates or maximum water content in the dam. Profits are
negatively affected by ramping restrictions. We find that profits are significantly affected
(by less than 10%) in the case of the most severe ramping constraints. However we also
find a range of less severe ramping constraints for which profits are impacted by less than
3%. In addition, by using the base regime in the regime switching model as the single
regime, the results show that introducing the spike regime increases the value of the power
plant and also increases the impact of ramping restrictions, but in our empirical example
this impact is not very sensitive to the spike regime.
All of these results will depend on the specifics of the particular hydro plant under
consideration such as the physical structure as well as the market structure that the plant
operates in such as the pricing system. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis shows that
these empirical findings are quite robust for this regime switching model for electricity
prices. Notwithstanding price spikes have a significant effect on the value of the hydro
power plant, one conclusion is that the ramping effect on profits mostly depends on the
level of the price relative to the cost of generation (how long and how frequent the price is
close to or below the cost), but is not very sensitive to the price jumps. In general ramping
restrictions have a larger effect in an environment where frequent ramping up or down is
desired. A lower speed of mean reversion, higher volatility and more frequent transition to
the spike regime all have the effect of increasing the impact of ramping restrictions.
An important conclusion of the chapter is that ramping restrictions should not be
determined in isolation, but rather using a cost-benefit approach that evaluates the trade
offs involved. This chapter has identified some of the important trade offs that should be
examined more carefully in future research. These include the impact on hydro plant’s
operation and profit.
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There are several directions for further research. First, we could account for uncertainty
in water inflow assuming it could be modelled as mean reverting stochastic processes, but
this would add another dimension to the HJB-PDE and obtaining the numerical solution
for this problem is nontrivial. Second, this chapter adapted electricity process parameter
estimates found in the literature. Further work is needed in estimating an electricity price
model using hourly data, preferably in the Q-measure to avoid the necessity of determining
an appropriate market price of risk. Third, further efforts are needed to construct a
measure of the environmental benefits for the river ecosystem gained by imposing these
ramping restrictions. Finally, the ramping issue could be better studied through a partial
equilibrium model of hydro-thermal competition. Then we could analyze the impact of
ramping restrictions on the electricity price, production, transmission, associated pollutant
emission of thermal power and social welfare.
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Chapter 4
An Options Pricing Approach to
Ramping Rate Restrictions at Hydro
Power Plants: An Extension to
Three Price Regimes
4.1 Introduction
In the third chapter (Niu and Insley [2014]), the empirical study on the impact of ramping
restrictions on our prototype plant is based on the Markov regime switching model of
Janczura and Weron [2009], where we assume a constant up-jump size when the price
process switches from the base regime to the spike regime and a constant down-jump size
when the price process switches from the spike regime to the base regime. The up-jump
size is set equal to the ratio of the spike regime mean price to the base regime mean price
and the down-jump size is roughly the inverse of the up-jump size. However, when the
regime switching occurs it is highly unlikely that the price will jump up or down at some
constant size. In fact, the fixed jump size used in the third chapter only represents the
average size of a jump when the regime switching happens. Therefore, it is desirable to
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extend the Markov regime switching model of Janczura and Weron [2009] to a model with
multiple jump sizes, which allows us to examine the impact of a random jump size on our
results.
In this chapter, we conduct numerical experiments on the jump size by proposing a
regime switching model with three regimes: the base regime (regime 1), the first spike
regime (regime 2), and the second spike regime (regime 3). Assuming different jump sizes
among these three regimes allows us to study the effect of multiple jump sizes on the
impact of ramping restrictions on the hydro plant. Ideally, we could use more regimes to
approximate the random jump size as close as possible. However, this will significantly
increase the computational complexity for this regime switching model. In fact, different
jump sizes among these three regimes in our proposed model could be viewed as the
simplest approximation of the random jump size observed from the data. To reduce the
computational burden, we further assume that only two possible switches among these three
regimes are permitted: switching between regimes 1 and 2; switching between regimes 1
and 3. In the empirical analysis, the jump size between the base regime and the first spike
regime is the same as the jump size (which represents the average jump size) between the
base regime and the spike regime in chapter 3. We will analyze two cases for the jump size
between the base regime and the second spike regime: a larger than the average jump size;
a smaller than the average jump size.
The empirical results from this chapter show that, even if multiple jump sizes are
incorporated into the regime switching model by adding the third regime, the findings
are very similar to what we get in the third chapter. There is a significant effect on
profits for the most restrictive ramping constraints, but we also observe a range of ramping
restrictions over which profits are not substantially affected. These numerical experiments
provide further evidence that ramping restrictions have a larger impact when the expected
variation in price is increased such as through an increase in jump size (for the third regime)
which makes it desirable to change water release rates relatively frequently.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
model and associated parameter values used in the empirical analysis. Sections three and
four contain the results from two numerical experiments: large jump size from the base
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regime to the second spike regime; small jump size from the base regime to the second
spike regime. Section five concludes.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis in this study is based on the medium-sized hydro plant similar
to the Abitibi Canyon generating station located on the Abitibi River in northeastern
Ontario. Detailed descriptions about this hydro plant are provided in chapter two. The
input parameters for the hydro power production and hydro dam specifications are reported
in Table 3.1 of chapter three. Since adding another regime to the model will significantly
increase the computation time, the analysis is conducted for a time horizon of three days
1.
Similar to the third chapter, we base our regime switching model on the model estimated
in Janczura and Weron [2009]. Under the Q measure, it is assumed the regime switching
process can be specified as follows for the base, the first spike, and the second spike regimes
respectively:
dP = [η(µ1 − P )− Λ1σ1
√
P ]dt+ σ1
√
PdZˆ + P (ξ12 − 1)dXˆ12 + P (ξ13 − 1)dXˆ13. (4.1)
dP = σ2(P −m)dzˆ + P (ξ21 − 1)dXˆ21, P > m. (4.2)
dP = σ3(P −m)dzˇ + P (ξ31 − 1)dXˆ31, P > m. (4.3)
where dZˆ, dzˆ, and dzˇ are the increments of the standard Gauss-Wiener processes under
the Q measure specified by the choice of Λ1, Λ2, and Λ3 respectively. dXˆ12, dXˆ21, dXˆ13,
and dXˆ31 indicate the transition of the Markov chain under the Q measure.
The parameter values used for Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) are shown in Table 4.1.
The long run price, µ1, median price, m, mean reversion speed, η, and volatilities σ1 and
1In the empirical experiments, the computational time for each case varies from several days to two
weeks.
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Table 4.1: Parameter Values for the Regime Switching Model (Three Price Regimes)
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
µ1 47.194 EUR/MWh η 0.36 - -
m 46.54 EUR/MWh c 20 EUR/MWh - -
σ1 0.73485 σ2 0.83066 σ3 0.83066
ξ12 1.6470 ξ21 0.6072 - -
ξ13 1.8470 (1.4470) ξ31 0.6911 (0.5414) - -
λQ11 0.991 λ
Q
12 0.0045 λ
Q
13 0.0045
λQ21 0.8402 λ
Q
22 0.1598 λ
Q
23 0
λQ31 0.8402 λ
Q
32 0 λ
Q
33 0.1598
Λ1 -0.2481 Λ2 -0.2481 Λ3 -0.2481
Pmax1 200 EUR/MWh P
max
2 200 EUR/MWh P
max
3 200 EUR/MWh
Pmin1 0 EUR/MWh P
min
2 48 EUR/MWh P
min
3 48 EUR/MWh
T 72h r¯ 0.05 annually - -
Base regime: dP = [η(µ1 − P )− Λ1σ1
√
P ]dt+ σ1
√
PdZˆ + P (ξ12 − 1)dXˆ12 + P (ξ13 − 1)dXˆ13.
First spike regime: dP = σ2(P −m)dzˆ + P (ξ21 − 1)dXˆ21, P > m.
Second spike regime: dP = σ3(P −m)dzˇ + P (ξ31 − 1)dXˆ31, P > m.
σ2 are taken from the Janczura and Weron estimates. The volatility for the second spike
regime σ3 is set equal to σ2. The up-jump and down-jump sizes between the base and the
first spike regimes ξ12 and ξ21 are the same as the jump sizes between the base and spike
regimes in chapter 3. We examine two cases for the jump size from the base regime to the
second spike regime ξ13: a larger jump size than ξ12 (the average jump size); a smaller jump
size (the value in the bracket) than ξ12. ξ31 refers to the corresponding down-jump size.
λQı , ı,  = 1, 2, 3 represent the regime transition intensities in the risk neutral world. λ
Q
12 is
set equal to λQ13, λ
Q
21 is set equal to λ
Q
31, and λ
Q
22 is set equal to λ
Q
33. The transition intensities
between the first and second spike regimes λQ23 and λ
Q
32 are zero since the transition between
these two regimes is not permitted by assumption. The market price of risk Λ is taken
from Cartea and Figueroa [2005] and assumed the same for the three regimes. Table 4.1
also reports the assumed variable cost of electricity production, c, the upper and lower
limits on price in the numerical analysis, Pminı and P
max
ı , ı = 1, 2, 3, the timeframe for the
analysis in hours, T , and the risk free rate, r¯.
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4.3 Case I: Large Jump Size from the Base Regime
to the Second Spike Regime
For Case I, we examine in detail the impact of ramping restrictions on our prototype power
plant for a large jump size from the base regime to the second spike regime. In this case,
Table 4.1 shows that the up-jump size ξ13 is 1.8470 and the down-jump size ξ31 is 0.6911.
4.3.1 Base Case for Case I
In this section, we present the numerical results for the base case when both the up-ramping
and down-ramping constraints are set at 3,000 CFS-hr. Similar to the third chapter, we
will report the numerical results for the following relationships: power plant value versus
price and release rate; optimal ramping rate versus price and release rate; optimal ramping
rate versus price and time; power plant value versus price and reservoir level; optimal
ramping rate versus price and reservoir level.
Figures 4.1(a) through 4.5(c) show the results for this base case2 when the constraints
for ramping rate, water release rate and water content are imposed. We first focus on the
value of the hydro plant as a function of water release rate and spot price. In Figures
4.1(b) and 4.1(c) the first and second spike regimes are defined for prices from 46.54 to 200
EUR/MWh. However, in Figure 4.1(a) the base regime is defined for the domain from 0 to
200 EUR/MWh. In the base regime we find that the value of the hydro plant and the spot
price are positively correlated. However, the hydro plant’s value and the water release rate
are positively correlated if the price is higher than 20 EUR/MWh and negatively correlated
if the price is lower than 20 EUR/MWh. When the spot price is in one of the two spike
regimes the value of the hydro plant is positively correlated with both water release rate
and spot price. As expected, at any given water release rate and spot price, the value of
the hydro plant in the second spike regime is higher than its value in the first spike regime
and the hydro plant has a higher value in both spike regimes than in the base regime.
2Figures 4.1(a) through 4.5(c) in this chapter are corresponding to Figures 3.3(a) through 3.7(b) in
chapter three, but include two spike regimes.
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Specifically, in the base regime the hydro plant has the maximum value of EUR 813,250 at
the release rate of 15,000 CFS and the price of 200 EUR/MWh and the minimum value of
EUR 567,090 at the release rate of 15,000 CFS and the price of 0 EUR/MWh. In addition,
in the first spike regime (the second spike regime) the hydro plant has the maximum value
of EUR 853,760 (EUR 880,130) at the release rate of 15,000 CFS and the price of 200
EUR/MWh and the minimum value of EUR 610,040 (EUR 613,080) at the release rate of
2,000 CFS and the price of 48 EUR/MWh.
We plot the optimal control strategies in Figures 4.2(a), 4.2(b), and 4.2(c), which are
corresponding to Figures 4.1(a), 4.1(b), and 4.1(c) respectively. Generally, for the base
regime the power plant will ramp up (ramp down) at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr
if the price is high (low). Similar to our findings in the third chapter, the constraints on
release rates and reservoir size also have an impact on optimal operations particularly in
the maximum and minimum release rate regions. For example, Figure 4.2(a) shows in the
low price and low release rate region the power plant must ramp up to avoid violating the
minimum release constraint. However as the release rate is increased, but remaining at low
prices the optimal action switches from ramping up to ramping down. Next, in the high
release rate and high price region the operator is not allowed to ramp up at the maximum
rate due to the maximum release rate constraint. The optimal control strategies for the
two spike regimes are virtually the same. Because of the much higher price in the spike
regime it is optimal for the hydro station to ramp up at 3,000 CFS-hr whenever possible
given the other constraints.
Regarding the optimal operational strategies for the hydro power plant as a function
of time and spot price, for the base regime Figures 4.3(a) shows that at low prices it is
optimal to ramp down and for high prices it is optimal to ramp up. The optimal control
strategy remains largely unchanged over time. At any given hour (except the terminal time
region) we observe four operational regions: ramping down at the maximum limit of 3,000
CFS-hr if the price is below 20 EUR/MWh; ramping down at 2,000 CFS-hr if the price
lies between 20 EUR/MWh and 40 EUR/MWh; ramping down at 1,500 CFS-hr when the
price is between 40 EUR/MWh and 60 EUR/MWh; ramping up at the maximum limit of
3,000 CFS-hr as the price moves above 60 EUR/MWh. Interestingly, the optimal control
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strategy changes dramatically in the terminal time region. Given the terminal boundary
condition of zero value, it is optimal to ramp up at the maximum allowed rate as time
moves into the terminal time region. For the two spike regimes (Figures 4.3(b) and 4.3(c))
higher prices make the station mostly ramp up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr.
Now, we analyze the results for the value of the hydro power plant as a function of
reservoir level and spot price. In all the three regimes (Figures 4.4(a), 4.4(b), and 4.4(c))
we find that the value of the hydro power plant has positive relationships with both the
reservoir level and spot price. Not surprisingly, at any given reservoir level and spot price,
the value of the hydro plant in the second spike regime is higher than its value in the
first spike regime and the base regime has the lowest value among these three regimes.
Specifically, in the base regime the power plant reaches the highest value of EUR 787,790
at the reservoir level of 17,000 acre-feet and the price of 200 EUR/MWh and the lowest
value of EUR 471,260 at the reservoir level of 7,000 acre-feet and the price of 0 EUR/MWh.
In addition, in the first spike regime (the second spike regime) the power plant reaches the
highest values of EUR 826,490 (EUR 851,360) at the reservoir level of 17,000 acre-feet and
the price of 200 EUR/MWh and the lowest value of EUR 495,950 (EUR 498,720) at the
reservoir level of 7,000 acre-feet and the price of 48 EUR/MWh.
The optimal control strategies corresponding to Figures 4.4(a), 4.4(b), and 4.4(c) are
shown in Figures 4.5(a), 4.5(b), and 4.5(c) respectively. As usual, in the base regime it is
optimal to ramp up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr at high prices and ramp down
at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr at low prices. However, in the low price region the
power plant operates quite differently when the reservoir level is close to or at the minimum
or maximum limit. First, in the low price and low reservoir level region the power plant will
ramp up at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr, but this tends to violate the lower water
content constraint.3 However, this should not cause any concerns because it is not optimal
for the power plant to operate anywhere close to the lower reservoir boundary. Second, in
the low price and full reservoir region the power plant will ramp down at rates lower than
the maximum allowed rate to keep the reservoir full. In addition, we also observe that there
3These results are obtained for the short time horizon of three days. If the model is run for a longer
time horizon (seven days), we should obtain more stable results similar to our findings in the third chapter.
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are some critical prices and reservoir levels where there is an operational boundary between
up ramping at the maximum limit of 3,000 CFS-hr and down ramping at the maximum
limit of 3,000 CFS-hr. For the two spike regimes, the power plant operates similarly to the
base regime when the price is higher than 48 EUR/MWh.
4.3.2 Impact of Changing Ramping Restrictions for Case I
For the hydro power plant, the numerical results for the impact of ramping constraints on
profits are summarized in Table 4.2, which is plotted in Figure 4.6(a) for the case of half
release rate and full reservoir level and in Figure 4.6(b) for the case of full release rate and
full reservoir level. Similar to what we find in the third chapter, as the constraints become
more restrictive the impact on profits becomes larger. However, these two figures also
show that for a large range of ramping rate restrictions the profit is not very sensitive to
these restrictions. Assuming everything else is held constant, higher initial electricity price
is always associated with higher present value. Given the same initial price, the second
spike regime (with a large jump size from the base regime to the spike regime) always gives
higher present value than the first spike regime (with an average jump size from the base
regime to the spike regime).
Given the initial price at 40 EUR/MWh, the reservoir level at the full capacity, the
water release rate at the upper limit and the inflow rate at 6,671 CFS, with ramping
constraints of 250 CSF-hr the total profit drops 7.9% relative to the scenario without
ramping restrictions. The reduction of profit in this most restrictive scenario is very similar
to what is found in chapter 3 where the total profit is reduced by 8.3% under the most
severe ramping restrictions. If the initial release rate is half of the upper limit while keeping
other conditions the same, then the total profit only drops 5.8% relative to the scenario
without ramping restrictions. Figures 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) show that profits are becoming
more sensitive for the restrictions on ramping rates of less than 1,000 CFS-hr and 3,000
CFS-hr respectively. We obtain similar results for different initial price, water release rate
and regime. When the price jumps to 160 EUR/MWh in the spike regime, the total profit
only drops 8.7% at the most restrictive ramping constraints of 250 CSF-hr.
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(a) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Release Rate for the First Spike Regime
(c) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Second Spike Regime
Figure 4.1: Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base, the First Spike, and the Second
Spike Regimes (Case I)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Base
Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the First
Spike Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Sec-
ond Spike Regime
Figure 4.2: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Base, the First
Spike, and the Second Spike Regimes (Case I)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the First Spike
Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Second Spike
Regime
Figure 4.3: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base, the First Spike, and
the Second Spike Regimes (Case I)
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(a) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the First Spike Regime
(c) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Second Spike
Regime
Figure 4.4: Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base, the First Spike, and the
Second Spike Regimes (Case I)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
First Spike Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Second Spike Regime
Figure 4.5: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base, the First
Spike, and the Second Spike Regimes (Case I)
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Table 4.2: Numerical Results Under Various Ramping Restrictions (Large Jump Size from
the Base Regime to the Second Spike Regime)
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 629520 627370 623880 616160 592880
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -2.1 -5.8
FF Profit 628190 624780 618940 594120 578810
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.5 -5.4 -7.9
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 662050 659080 654610 644370 619800
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.1 -2.7 -6.4
FF Profit 664670 661570 656540 635530 623470
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -4.4 -6.2
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 779940 775230 768060 747290 714710
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.2 -8.4
FF Profit 792790 790360 786780 776460 773980
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -2.1 -2.4
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 3 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 668970 666000 661500 650980 626200
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.7 -6.4
FF Profit 671570 668640 663900 644330 633720
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -4.1 -5.6
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 3 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 799210 794340 786920 764430 729630
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.4 -8.7
FF Profit 812460 810120 806730 797610 795770
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.7 -1.8 -2.1
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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(a) Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Half Release Rate
and Full Reservoir Level
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(b) Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Full Release Rate
and Full Reservoir Level
Figure 4.6: Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Half Release Rate and Full
Reservoir Level and at Full Release Rate and Full Reservoir Level (Case I)
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4.4 Case II: Small Jump Size from the Base Regime
to the Second Spike Regime
In this section, we investigate the impact of ramping restrictions on our prototype power
plant for a small jump size from the base regime to the second spike regime. Now, the
up-jump size ξ13 is changed to 1.4470 and the down-jump size ξ31 is set at 0.5414 (Table
4.1). We first report the numerical results for the base case with both the up-ramping and
down-ramping constraints at 3,000 CFS-hr and then analyze the impact of the ramping
constraints on the total profit of the hydro plant over a range of ramping constraints. Since
the results for this small jump size case are very similar to the findings for the large jump
size case, we will mainly focus on their differences.
It is noticed that Figures 4.7(a) through 4.11(c) for Case II are corresponding to Figures
4.1(a) through 4.5(c) for Case I. First, Figures 4.7(a), 4.7(b), and 4.7(c) show how the value
of the hydro plant varies with the water release rate and spot price4. As expected, at any
given water release rate and spot price, the hydro plant has a higher value in both spike
regimes than in the base regime, but the value of the hydro plant in the second spike regime
is lower than its value in the first spike regime. Specifically, in the base regime the power
plant reaches the highest value of EUR 801,480 at the release rate of 15,000 CFS and the
price of 200 EUR/MWh and the lowest value of EUR 552,940 at the release rate of 15,000
CFS and the price of 0 EUR/MWh. Furthermore,, in the first spike regime (the second
spike regime) the power plant has the maximum value of EUR 842,130 (EUR 821,560)
at the release rate of 15,000 CFS and the price of 200 EUR/MWh and the minimum
value of EUR 596,020 (EUR 592,050) at the release rate of 2,000 CFS and the price of 48
EUR/MWh.
Figures 4.10(a), 4.10(b), and 4.10(c) shows how the value of the hydro power plant de-
pends on the reservoir level and spot price5. Not surprisingly, at any given reservoir level
4The corresponding optimal control strategies in Figures 4.8(a), 4.8(b), and 4.8(c) are virtually the
same as those shown in Figures 4.2(a), 4.2(b), and 4.2(c) for Case I. In addition, in Figures 4.9(a), 4.9(b),
and 4.9(c) the optimal operational strategies for the hydro power plant as a function of time and spot
price are also very similar to those shown in Figures 4.3(a), 4.3(b), and 4.3(c) for Case I.
5The associated optimal control strategies in Figures 4.11(a), 4.11(b), and 4.11(c) behave similarly as
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and spot price, the value of the hydro plant in the first spike regime is higher than its value
in the second spike regime and the base regime gives the lowest value. In particular, in the
base regime the power plant has the highest value of EUR 775,520 when the current reser-
voir level is 17,000 acre-feet and the price is 200 EUR/MWh and the lowest value of EUR
461,040 when the current reservoir level is 7,000 acre-feet and the price is 0 EUR/MWh.
Additionally, in the first spike regime (the second spike regime) the value is at the highest
level of EUR 814,360 (EUR 794,960) when the current reservoir level is 17,000 acre-feet
and the price is 200 EUR/MWh and at the lowest level of EUR 486,030 (EUR 482,550)
when the current reservoir level is 7,000 acre-feet and the price is 48 EUR/MWh.
Now, we analyze impact of the ramping constraints on the value of the hydro power
plant. The results are reported in Table 4.3 and plotted in Figures 4.12(a) and 4.12(b).
Similar to what we find for Case I, more restrictive constraints have a larger impact on
profits. But, the profit is not very sensitive to ramping rate restrictions. As usual, if we
keep everything else constant, higher initial electricity price always results in higher present
value. However, for the case of small jump size from the base regime to the second spike
regime, given the same initial price the second spike regime (with a small jump size from
the base regime to the spike regime) always gives lower present value than the first spike
regime (with an average jump size from the base regime to the spike regime). As expected,
the small jump size case gives an overall lower value than the large jump size case. In
addition, in the small jump size case ramping restrictions have a smaller impact than in
the large jump size case. However the change is again quite small, with the most severe
restrictions reducing profits by 8.2 % in the small jump size case compared to 8.7 % in the
large jump size case. Restrictive ramping constraints will limit the power plant’s ability to
make profits during price spikes, therefore the power plant’s value is more severely affected
when the spike regime has a large jump size.
those shown in Figures 4.5(a), 4.5(b), and 4.5(c) for Case I.
110
(a) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Release Rate for the First Spike Regime
(c) Value over Price and Release Rate for the Second Spike Regime
Figure 4.7: Value over Price and Release Rate for the Base, the First Spike, and the Second
Spike Regimes (Case II)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Base
Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the First
Spike Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Sec-
ond Spike Regime
Figure 4.8: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Release Rate for the Base, the First
Spike, and the Second Spike Regimes (Case II)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the First Spike
Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Second Spike
Regime
Figure 4.9: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Time for the Base, the First Spike, and
the Second Spike Regimes (Case II)
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(a) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base Regime
(b) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the First Spike Regime
(c) Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Second Spike
Regime
Figure 4.10: Value over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base, the First Spike, and the
Second Spike Regimes (Case II)
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(a) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Base Regime
(b) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
First Spike Regime
(c) Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the
Second Spike Regime
Figure 4.11: Optimal Ramping Rate over Price and Reservoir Level for the Base, the First
Spike, and the Second Spike Regimes (Case II)
115
Table 4.3: Numerical Results Under Various Ramping Restrictions (Small Jump Size from
the Base Regime to the Second Spike Regime)
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 616750 614740 611470 604670 582660
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 -5.5
FF Profit 615460 612230 606680 583220 569400
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.4 -5.2 -7.5
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 649420 646590 642330 632940 609570
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.5 -6.1
FF Profit 652120 649190 644430 624760 614090
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -4.2 -5.8
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 767400 762840 755890 735830 704220
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.1 -8.2
FF Profit 780460 778230 774980 765980 764000
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.7 -1.9 -2.1
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 3 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 643910 641070 636800 627600 604360
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.5 -6.1
FF Profit 646630 643530 638520 617670 605860
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -4.5 -6.3
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 3 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 752470 748030 741280 722590 692680
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.0 -8.0
FF Profit 765230 762940 759510 749410 746840
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -2.1 -2.4
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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(a) Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Half Release Rate
and Full Reservoir Level
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(b) Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Full Release Rate
and Full Reservoir Level
Figure 4.12: Total Profit vs Ramping Rate Restrictions at Half Release Rate and Full
Reservoir Level and at Full Release Rate and Full Reservoir Level (Case II)
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4.5 Conclusions
One of the major features of electricity price spikes is that when a jump occurs the price
tends to jump up or down at a random size. To incorporate this characteristic into the
regime switching model, we make a simple approximation of the random jump size by
proposing a three regimes model (one base and two spike regimes) with multiple jump
sizes. Within this framework, this chapter studies the effect of multiple jump sizes on the
impact of ramping restrictions on a hydro power plant.
Using a prototype hydro dam, we valued the hydro plant for a range of ramping re-
strictions for the three regimes model for a three days period. Two numerical experiments
are conducted for the multiple jump sizes: average jump size between the base regime and
the first spike regime and larger than the average jump size between the base regime and
the second spike regime; average jump size between the base regime and the first spike
regime and smaller than the average jump size between the base regime and the second
spike regime. As expected, these numerical experiments give consistent results as what we
find in chapter 3. For both numerical experiments, we find that profits are significantly
affected by less than 9% in the case of the most severe ramping constraints and for a range
of less severe ramping constraints profits are impacted by less than 2%. In addition, by
introducing multiple jump sizes into the regime switching model, the results show that:
(i) the present value in the spike regime with a large jump size is always higher than the
present value in the spike regime with a small jump size; (ii) the small jump size case
gives an overall lower value than the large jump size case; (iii) in the small jump size case
ramping restrictions have a smaller impact than in the large jump size case.
This chapter adopted the Markov regime switching model and the associated parameter
estimates found in the literature. We also made strong assumptions on other parameter
values such as the transition intensities and the jump sizes. Further work is needed in
estimating an electricity price model in the following directions: estimating the model in
an hourly frequency; estimating the market price of risk; estimating the distribution of the
jump size from one regime to another; improving the timing of spikes.
118
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The ability of hydro facilities to respond quickly through ramping to changing demand and
price conditions is one of the benefits of hydro power. However the significant negative
consequences of ramping on aquatic ecosystems needs to be considered by regulators. These
negative impacts are case specific, dependent on the physical structure of the dam and
the ecological conditions of particular rivers and streams. In cases where ramping rate
restrictions are being considered, apart from the environmental gains to the river ecosystem,
there should be a recognition of the costs imposed on hydro operators in terms of lost profits
as well as potential environmental impacts that result from the need to utilize alternative
sources of electricity. Ideally ramping rate regulations would be determined through a
careful analysis of all the potential impacts. This thesis contributes to our understanding
of the impact of ramping restrictions on the hydro station’s operation and profit and the
trade offs involved.
In both non-stochastic and stochastic frameworks, the thesis finds highly consistent
results on the impact of ramping restrictions on the hydro station’s profit. For our medium-
sized power plant profits are negatively affected by ramping restrictions. We observe profits
are significantly affected (by less than 7% in chapter 2, by less than 10% in chapter 3, and
by less than 9% in chapter 4) in the case of the most severe ramping constraints, but we also
observe a range of less severe ramping restrictions over which profits are not substantially
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affected (by less than 2% in chapter 2, by less than 3% in chapter 3, and by less than 2%
in chapter 4).
In chapter two, we examine the effect of ramping restrictions imposed by a regulator
on a hydro power plant’s operation and profit. In a non-stochastic environment, we solve
a dynamic non-linear model of the profit maximizing decision by a prototype hydro plant
over 5 days given physical and environmental restrictions on water release rates. We
assume the hydro plant must meet a minimum level of contract electricity demand through
hydro production, purchasing on the spot market for resale, or some combinations of these
two. Using data that is representative of a medium-sized hydro operation in Ontario,
we investigate the operator’s optimal decisions regarding hydro production and power
purchases in on-peak and off-peak periods where on- and off-peak prices are assumed known
and constant. In particular, we examine the sensitivity of hydro station profits to ramping
restrictions as well as the potential impact on electricity production from hydro and other
sources. The associated benefits and costs of ramping rate restrictions include the lost
profit for the hydro operator, the environmental impact of changed reliance on thermal
power, and the environmental benefit for the river ecosystem. Using the replacement
power approach, we estimate the environmental cost (or benefit) of this change in thermal
production due to the resulting change in air pollution emissions. In absence of monetary
measure for the environmental benefit of ramping restrictions for the river ecosystem, we
estimate the other two impacts to provide a lower bound for the environmental benefit of
ramping rate restrictions that would be required in order for them to be worthwhile.
In this second chapter, our analysis shows ramping restrictions have a negative effect
on profits since a hydro operator is forced to make different choices (on hydro production
and power purchases) than when no ramping restrictions are imposed. In particular prof-
its are reduced if ramping restrictions force hydro operators to increase hydro production
in off-peak periods when prices are lower. A more surprising result is that ramping re-
strictions can cause an increase in the total amount of hydro power produced for a given
day. This result follows from the desire of the hydro operator to mitigate the effect of the
ramping constraints by increasing power production in off-peak periods while at the same
time attempting to maintain production as much as possible in on-peak periods. Under
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the replacement power assumption, the increased hydro production results in a reduction
in air pollution emissions. This constitutes an added environmental benefit of ramping
restrictions, in addition to any benefits to the river ecosystem. We calculate a net cost
of the ramping restrictions as the lost profits net of any environmental benefit of reduced
air pollution. This net cost can be compared to expected environmental benefits from an
improved aquatic ecosystem.
In chapter three, we investigate the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant
operations and profitability using a Markov regime switching model of electricity prices.
Hydro operations are formulated as a stochastic control problem subject to various physical
and environmental constraints which results in the HJB-PDE for the value of the hydro
station. The optimal control is obtained by solving the HJB-PDE numerically using a
fully implicit finite difference approach with semi-Lagrangian time stepping. For the same
prototype hydro dam as chapter 2 we value the power plant and model the lost profits for
a range of ramping restrictions for the regime switching model over a one week period. We
pay special attention to how the impact of ramping restrictions depends on the marginal
cost of hydroelectric power and the characteristics of the assumed price process, and how
the presence of two price regimes affects hydro plant value and optimal operations. In the
stochastic environment, it is notoriously difficult to measure the environmental cost (or
benefit) of alternate thermal power generation when ramping restrictions are imposed. In
absence of monetary measure for the environmental benefit of ramping restrictions for the
aquatic ecosystem, we seek to examine the other side of the equation - the costs of these
restrictions in terms of lost profitability. Knowledge of these costs will help illuminate the
trade offs involved and inform the design of regulations.
In this third chapter, we find that in most scenarios the hydro plant will ramp up or
down at the maximum allowed rates. The exception to this is when the dam is up against
one of the other constraints such as maximum/minimum release rates or maximum water
content in the dam. The sensitivity analysis shows that ramping restrictions have a larger
effect in an environment where frequent ramping up or down is desired. A lower speed
of mean reversion, higher volatility and more frequent transition to the spike regime will
increase the impact of ramping restrictions. One conclusion is that the ramping effect on
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profits mostly depends on the price relative to the cost of generation (how long and how
frequent the price is close to or below the cost), but is not very sensitive to the price jumps.
In chapter four, we study the impact of ramping restrictions on hydro plant operations
and profitability by extending the regime switching model in chapter 3 to a model with
multiple jump sizes. Specifically, we propose a regime switching model with three regimes
among which the jump sizes are different. For the same prototype hydro dam as chapter 2
we examine the effect of multiple jump sizes on the impact of ramping restrictions on the
hydro plant’s operation and profit over 3 days. In this fourth chapter, the two numerical
experiments provide further evidence that ramping restrictions have a larger impact when
the expected variation in price is increased such as through an increase in jump size (for the
third regime) which makes it desirable to change water release rates relatively frequently.
All of these results in this thesis will depend on the specifics of the particular hydro plant
under consideration such as the physical structure as well as the market structure that the
plant operates in such as the pricing system. In general, these empirical findings are quite
robust under different specifications for electricity prices. An important conclusion of the
thesis is that ramping restrictions should not be determined in isolation, but rather using
a cost-benefit approach that evaluates the trade offs involved. This thesis has identified
some of the important trade offs that should be examined more carefully in future research.
These include the impact on hydro plant’s operation and profit as well as the environmental
impact of a change in the intensity of use of other types of power.
In practice, to determine the appropriate ramping restrictions for a specific hydro plant
a regulator should consider the following steps. We should start by specifying the functional
form for the generation of hydroelectric power and then estimate the parameter values for
this function using historical data including the power output, water flow rate, water head,
water content and generation efficiency. Next, we can assume and estimate the stochastic
processes for electricity prices based on hourly data from the spot market where the hydro
plant sells its power. Now the associated benefits and costs of ramping restrictions could
be calculated by using the methods proposed in this thesis. These include the lost profit
for the hydro plant and the environmental externality of the replacement thermal power
(using the marginal external cost of emissions for that market). It is noticed that the cost-
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benefit analysis is not complete unless we could put a dollar value on the environmental
benefit of ramping restrictions on the river ecosystem. However, currently there are no
studies available to directly provide monetary measures of the environmental benefit of
ramping restrictions1. To address this issue, one possible option is to use the contingent
valuation (CV) approach to obtain the willingness to pay (WTP) values of restricting the
ramping rate of the hydro operator to protect the river ecosystem. If this experiment at the
policy site is not feasible due to the time and resource constraints, then the benefit transfer
approach could be used to calculate these values when similar studies at another place and
time are available. However, adjustments are normally required for the consistency between
the study and policy sites with respect to commodities, markets, and welfare measures. In
addition, to design the ramping policy the regulator should also consider the environmental
scientists’ views which are based on the scientific evidence from biological studies.
There are several directions for further research. First, we could account for uncertainty
in water inflow and solve the HJB-PDE with two dimensional stochastic processes for
the electricity price and water inflow. Second, further work is needed in estimating an
electricity price model in the following directions: estimating the model in an hourly
frequency; estimating the market price of risk; estimating the distribution of the up- and
down-jump sizes; improving the timing of spikes. Third, further efforts are needed to
construct a monetary measure of the environmental benefits for the river ecosystem when
ramping restrictions are imposed. Fourth, an alternative hydro dam with different physical
structure and power production function could be used. Finally, the ramping issue could
be better studied through a partial equilibrium model of hydro-thermal competition. This
would allow us to analyze the impact of ramping restrictions on the equilibrium price and
production, associated pollutant emission of thermal power and social welfare.
1In this case, it becomes very important to obtain an accurate measure of the associated costs of
ramping restrictions such as the lost profit for the hydro plant. Regulators and industry can use this
information to negotiate the possible compensation for the hydro plant and the optimal ramping rate for
environmental and economic benefits.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Derivation and Numerical Algorithms of HJB-
PDE
A.1.1 Derivation of HJB-PDE
Given Equation (3.21), hedging arguments are used to derive the HJB-PDE, Equation
(3.23), describing the value of the hydro dam. The derivation of Equation (3.23) is based
on Kennedy [2007] who analyzes the pricing of financial derivatives under regime switching
prices. This derivation is also based on Chen and Forsyth [2008] who consider optimal
control of a hydro dam assuming prices follow jump diffusion.
A target option V is hedged with a portfolio of N instruments {Γn¯}Nn¯=1 whose values
depend on the underlying electricity price P . There is a bank account B that earns the
risk free rate r¯. The value of the hedge position is
Π = −V +
N∑
n¯=1
$n¯Γn¯ +B. (A.1)
where $n¯ is the weight for the n¯th hedging instrument. If the Markov chain is now in state
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ı, the instantaneous change in the target option over an instant dt is obtained using Itoˆ’s
lemma:
V ı(P + dP,w + dw, r + dr, t+ dt) = V ı + V ıt dt+ V
ı
r dr + V
ı
wdw + V
ı
PdP +
1
2
V ırrdrdr
+
1
2
V ıwwdwdw +
1
2
V ıPPdPdP + V
ı
PwdPdw
+V ıPrdPdr + V
ı
wrdwdr.
In addition, the profit generated over the instant dt is given by
H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c)dt.
Making the appropriate substitutions in Equation (A.2) for dw, dr and dP , we have
dV = µˆıdt+ σˆıdZ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
∆V ıdXı. (A.2)
where
µˆı =
[∂V ı
∂t
+ z
∂V ı
∂r
+H(r, w)a(`− r)∂V
ı
∂w
+ µı(P, t)
∂V ı
∂P
+
1
2
(σı)2(P, t)
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c)].
σˆı = σı(P, t)
∂V ı
∂P
.
∆V ı = V  − V ı.
V κ = V κ(Pξıκ, w, r, t).
(A.3)
Similarly for each of the hedging instruments, we have
dΓn¯ = µ¯
ı
n¯dt+ σ¯
ı
n¯dZ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
∆Γın¯dXı. (A.4)
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where
µ¯ın¯ =
[∂Γın¯
∂t
+ µı(P, t)
∂Γın¯
∂P
+
1
2
(σı)2(P, t)
∂2Γın¯
∂P 2
]
.
σ¯ın¯ = σ
ı(P, t)
∂Γın¯
∂P
.
∆Γın¯ = Γ

n¯ − Γın¯.
Γκn¯ = Γ
κ
n¯(Pξ
ıκ, t).
(A.5)
Now we use equations for dV and dΓn¯ to specify the instantaneous change in the value
of the hedging portfolio which is
dΠ = −dV +
N∑
n¯=1
$n¯dΓn¯ + dB
=
[− µˆı + N∑
n¯=1
$n¯µ¯
ı
n¯ + r¯B
]
dt+
[− σˆı + N∑
n¯=1
$n¯σ¯
ı
n¯
]
dZ
+
N∑
=1
6=ı
[−∆V ı + N∑
n¯=1
$n¯∆Γ
ı
n¯
]
dXı. (A.6)
In order to hedge both the diffusion risk (one equation) and the regime switching risk
(N − 1 equations), the following N linear equations need to hold
N∑
n¯=1
$n¯σ¯
ı
n¯ = σˆ
ı.
N∑
n¯=1
$n¯∆Γ
ı
n¯ = ∆V
ı  = 1, 2, . . . , N ;  6= ı.
After eliminating both the diffusion risk and the regime switching risk, the hedging portfolio
should earn the risk free rate of return to avoid arbitrage opportunities. This implies that
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dΠ = r¯Πdt. Using Equation (A.1) for the portfolio value Π and Equation (A.6) for its
differential form dΠ, the non-arbitrage condition is given by
N∑
n¯=1
$n¯(µ¯
ı
n¯ − r¯Γın¯) = µˆı − r¯V ı.
Now, we have a linear system consisting N + 1 equations and N unknowns.

σ¯ı1 σ¯
ı
2 · · · σ¯ıN
∆Γı11 ∆Γ
ı1
2 · · · ∆Γı1N
∆Γı21 ∆Γ
ı2
2 · · · ∆Γı2N
...
...
. . .
...
∆Γ
ı(ı−1)
1 ∆Γ
ı(ı−1)
2 · · · ∆Γı(ı−1)N
∆Γ
ı(ı+1)
1 ∆Γ
ı(ı+1)
2 · · · ∆Γı(ı+1)N
...
...
. . .
...
∆ΓıN1 ∆Γ
ıN
2 · · · ∆ΓıNN
µ¯ı1 − r¯Γı1 µ¯ı2 − r¯Γı2 · · · µ¯ıN − r¯ΓıN


$1
$2
$3
...
...
...
...
$N−1
$N

=

σˆı
∆V ı1
∆V ı2
...
∆V ı(ı−1)
∆V ı(ı+1)
...
∆V ıN
µˆı − r¯V ı

Hence, this matrix system is over specified. To obtain a solution this system must be
linearly dependent. We assume the following linear combination of the system of equations
Λı ×R1 − λQı1 ×R2 − λQı2 ×R3 − . . .− λQıN ×RN −RN+1. (A.7)
where R refers to the th row of the matrix system above. This means that each element
in (A.7) must be zero for some choice of Λı and {λQı}N=1, 6=ı. Therefore, following Kennedy
[2007] (Appendix A), we obtain another matrix system given by
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
σ¯ı1 ∆Γ
ı1
1 · · · ∆Γı(ı−1)1 ∆Γı(ı+1)1 · · · ∆ΓıN−11 ∆ΓıN1
σ¯ı2 ∆Γ
ı1
2 · · · ∆Γı(ı−1)2 ∆Γı(ı+1)2 · · · ∆ΓıN−12 ∆ΓıN2
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
σ¯ıN ∆Γ
ı1
N · · · ∆Γı(ı−1)N ∆Γı(ı+1)N · · · ∆ΓıN−1N ∆ΓıNN
σˆı ∆V ı1 · · · ∆V ı(ı−1) ∆V ı(ı+1) · · · ∆V ıN−1 ∆V ıN


Λı
−λQı1
...
−λQı(ı−1)
−λQı(ı+1)
...
−λQı(N−1)
−λQıN

=

µ¯ı1 − r¯Γı1
µ¯ı2 − r¯Γı2
...
...
...
...
µ¯ıN − r¯ΓıN
µˆı − r¯V ı

In this matrix system, the linear equations are independent to each other. We take the
last equation from this matrix and get
Λıσˆı −
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı∆V
ı = µˆı − r¯V ı (A.8)
Substituting µˆı, σˆı and ∆V ı from Equation (A.3) into Equation (A.8), we get
0 =
∂V ı
∂t
+ sup
z∈Z(r)
(z
∂V ı
∂r
) +H(r, w)a(`− r)∂V
ı
∂w
+
1
2
(σı)2(P, t)
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+ (µı(P, t)− Λıσı(P, t))∂V
ı
∂P
+H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c)− r¯V ı +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı(V
 − V ı).
(A.9)
Following the same procedure, the system of PDE’s for ı = 1, 2, . . . , N could be derived.
Recall that Λı is the market price of risk and is multiplied by the volatility term, σı(P, t),
and deducted from the drift, µı(P, t), giving the risk adjusted drift for price in regime ı.
The λQı ’s ( 6= ı) are the risk adjusted transition intensity of a regime switch. These may
be contrasted with the real world transition intensities, qı specified in Equation (3.2).
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A.1.2 Numerical Algorithms
We use equally spaced grids in P , w and r directions for the PDE discretization, respectively
denoted by [P0, P1, . . . , Pimax ], [w0, w1, . . . , wjmax ] and [r0, r1, . . . , rkmax ] with P0 = 0, Pimax =
Pmax, w0 = w
min, wjmax = w
max, r0 = r
min and rkmax = r
max. When the jump size
is greater than 1, the price may move above Pmax. To avoid the price jumping out of
the computational domain, we use an augmented jump amplitude near Pmax (as done by
Kennedy [2007]) and define ξ¯ı(P ) as follows
ξ¯ı(P ) =
ξı if 0 ≤ P ≤ P
max
ξı
Pmax
P
if P
max
ξı
< P ≤ Pmax
Now P ξ¯ı(P ) will remain in [0, Pmax].
Let 0 = 0∆τ < . . . < ℵ∆τ = T be the discrete timesteps and τn = n∆τ denote the
nth timestep. Let V ı(Pi, wj, rk, τ
n) denote the exact solution of the pricing equation when
the electricity spot price is Pi, the water content is wj, the outflow rate is rk, the discrete
time is τn, and the regime is ı. Let V ı,ni,j,k denote an approximation of the exact solution
V ı(Pi, wj, rk, τ
n).
We use standard finite difference methods to discretize the operator C0V
ı, CV ı and
C1V
ı as defined in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. Following Chen and Forsyth [2007, 2008], let
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k denote the discrete value of the differential operators C0V
ı, CV ı or C1V
ı at a node
(Pi, wj, rk, τ
n) in regime ı, so that (CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k is an approximation for (C0V )
ı,n
i,j,k if Pi = 0, an
approximation for (CV )ı,ni,j,k if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax), and an approximation for (C1V )ı,ni,j,k if Pi =
Pmax. The operators can be discretized using central, forward, or backward differencing in
the P direction to give
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(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = γ
ı
iV
ı,n
i−1,j,k + β
ı
iV
ı,n
i+1,j,k −
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
= βıiV
ı,n
i+1,j,k −
(
βıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi = 0
= γıiV
ı,n
i−1,j,k −
(
γıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi = P
max
(A.10)
where γıi and β
ı
i are defined in Appendices A.1.7, A.1.8, and A.1.9. The algorithm uses
central differencing as much as possible at each node since it is more accurate (d’Halluin
et al. [2004]). The use of forward or backward differencing guarantees γıi and β
ı
i satisfy the
following positive coefficient conditions: γıi ≥ 0 and βıi ≥ 0 for i = 0, · · · , imax, ı = 1, · · · , N .
Let (BεV )
ı,n
i,j,k be an approximation of the operator BV
ı at a mesh node (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n).
For BV ı =
∑N
=1
 6=ı
λQıV
, we have
(BεV )
ı,n
i,j,k =
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQıχ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,ni∗+1,j,k). (A.11)
where, V  = V (Piξ¯
ı(Pi), wj, rk, τ
n) is approximated by the linear interpolation using V ,ni∗ ,j,k
and V ,ni∗+1,j,k, written as χ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,ni∗+1,j,k) with Pi∗ ≤ Piξ¯ı(Pi) ≤ Pi∗+1.
A.1.3 Numerical Scheme for Pricing Equations
Following Chen and Forsyth [2007, 2008], we discretize the terms in PDE (3.23) using
a semi-Lagrangian time-stepping. Regarding P as fixed, then in regime ı the total (La-
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grangian) derivative for V ı = V ı(P,w(τ), r(τ), τ) along a trajectory w = w(τ), r = r(τ)
is
DV ı
Dτ
=
∂V ı
∂τ
+
∂V ı
∂r
dr
dτ
+
∂V ı
∂w
dw
dτ
=
∂V ı
∂τ
− ∂V
ı
∂r
dr
dt
− ∂V
ı
∂w
dw
dt
=
∂V ı
∂τ
− z∂V
ı
∂r
−H(r, w)a(`− r)∂V
ı
∂w
. (A.12)
Here we use the dynamics of w in Equation (3.6) and r in Equation (3.9). Now Equation
(3.23) can be written as
DV ı
Dτ
= CV ı +BV ı +H(r, w)q(r, h(w))(P − c). (A.13)
Let ζ ı,n+1i,j,k denote the value of the control variable z at the mesh node (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n+1).
At (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n+1), DV
ı
Dτ
is approximated by
(
DV
Dτ
)ı,n+1
i,j,k
=
1
∆τ
(V ı,n+1i,j,k − V ı,ni,jˆ,kˆ) + truncation error . (A.14)
where V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
is an approximation of V ı(Pi, w
n
jˆ
, rn
kˆ
, τn) obtained by linear interpolation with
wn
jˆ
and rn
kˆ
given by
wn
jˆ
= min[max[wj +H(rk, wj)a(`− rk)∆τ, wmin], wmax]. (A.15)
rn
kˆ
= rk + ζ
ı,n+1
i,j,k ∆τ. (A.16)
Equation (A.15) guarantees that wn
jˆ
will remain in the domain [wmin, wmax]. The control
ζ ı,n+1i,j,k must satisfy the constraint ζ
ı,n+1
i,j,k ∈ Z(rk). Let Zk ⊆ Z(rk) denote the set of values
of ζ ı,n+1i,j,k ∈ Z(rk) such that the resulting rnkˆ computed from (A.16) is bounded within
[rmin, rmax].
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Now at any discrete mesh node (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n+1), n ≥ 0, PDE (3.23) and the associated
boundary Equations (3.25) and (3.26) can be discretized as
V ı,n+1i,j,k = sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
+ ∆τ(CεV )
ı,n+1
i,j,k + ∆τ(BεV )
ı,n+1
i,j,k + ∆τH(rk, wj)q(rk, h(wj))(Pi − c).
(A.17)
Substituting (CεV )
ı,n+1
i,j,k from (A.10) and (BεV )
ı,n+1
i,j,k from (A.11) into (A.17), we get
−∆τγıiV ı,n+1i−1,j,k + [1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
]V ı,n+1i,j,k −∆τβıiV ı,n+1i+1,j,k
= sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
+ ∆τH(rk, wj)q(rk, h(wj))(Pi − c) + ∆τ
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQıχ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n+1
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,n+1i∗+1,j,k)
if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
(A.18)
[1 + ∆τ
(
βıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
]V ı,n+1i,j,k −∆τβıiV ı,n+1i+1,j,k
= sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
−∆τH(rk, wj)q(rk, h(wj))c+ ∆τ
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQıχ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n+1
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,n+1i∗+1,j,k)
if Pi = 0
(A.19)
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−∆τγıiV ı,n+1i−1,j,k + [1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
]V ı,n+1i,j,k
= sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
+ ∆τH(rk, wj)q(rk, h(wj))(Pi − c) + ∆τ
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQıχ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n+1
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,n+1i∗+1,j,k)
if Pi = P
max
(A.20)
A.1.4 Solving the Local Optimization Problems
We use the method suggested by Chen and Forsyth [2008] to solve a discrete local opti-
mization problem
sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
(A.21)
at a mesh node (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n+1) in scheme (A.17). Given a mesh node (Pi, wj, rk, τ
n+1),
wn
jˆ
is fixed in (A.15) and in (A.16) rn
kˆ
varies for different values of ζ ı,n+1i,j,k , where all the
values of rn
kˆ
form a closed region, denoted by
Rk =
{
rn
kˆ
|rn
kˆ
= rk + ζ
ı,n+1
i,j,k ∆τ, ∀ζ ı,n+1i,j,k ∈ Zk
}
From Rk we select a sequence of values, denoted by Rˆk, which includes all the discrete grid
nodes in the r direction and the maximum and minimum values in Rk. Then we choose
the rn
kˆ
∈Rˆk which maximizes V ı,ni,jˆ,kˆ. This means we now solve an alternative problem
sup
rn
kˆ
∈Rˆk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
(A.22)
It is shown in Chen and Forsyth [2008] that the solutions to problems (A.21) and (A.22)
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are consistent.
A.1.5 Matrix Form of the Discrete Equations
We now set up the matrix form of the discrete Equation (A.17). Let
V ı,n+1j,k =

V ı,n+10,j,k
V ı,n+11,j,k
...
V ı,n+1imax,j,k

and
V ı,n
jˆ,kˆ
=

V ı,n
0,jˆ,kˆ
V ı,n
1,jˆ,kˆ
...
V ı,n
imax,jˆ,kˆ

Let
V¯ ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
= sup
ζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk
V ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
Then we have
V¯ ı,n
jˆ,kˆ
=

V¯ ı,n
0,jˆ,kˆ
V¯ ı,n
1,jˆ,kˆ
...
V¯ ı,n
imax,jˆ,kˆ

Let
H¯j,k = H(rk, wj)q(rk, h(wj)).
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The discrete Equation (A.17) may be written in matrix form as
[I +M ı]V ı,n+1j,k = V¯
ı,n
jˆ,kˆ
+ ∆τH¯j,k(P − ιc) + ∆τΞ(V ı,n+1j,k ). (A.23)
where
[M ıV ı,n+1j,k ]ith row = ∆τ [−γıiV ı,n+1i−1,j,k +
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,n+1i,j,k − βıiV ı,n+1i+1,j,k].
I =

1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1

ι =

1
1
...
1

and
Ξ(V ı,n+1j,k ) =
[
V˜ 1,n+1j,k V˜
2,n+1
j,k · · · V˜ ı,n+1j,k · · · V˜ N,n+1j,k
]

λQı1
λQı2
...
0
...
λQıN

where
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V˜ ,n+1j,k =

V˜ ,n+10,j,k
V˜ ,n+11,j,k
...
V˜ ,n+1i,j,k
...
V˜ ,n+1imax,j,k

and 0 is the ıth element of the column vector. The ith element of vector V˜ ,n+1j,k for
 = 1, . . . , N is given by χ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), V
,n+1
i∗ ,j,k
, V ,n+1i∗+1,j,k).
A.1.6 Solution Algorithms
To solve Equation (A.23), we use the fixed point iteration algorithm as described in
Kennedy [2007]. The algorithm is given by
V 0 = Option Payoff
for n = 0, ..., do
for j = 0, ..., do
for k = 0, ..., do
for ı = 0, ..., do
for i = 0, ..., do
V¯ ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
= supζı,n+1i,j,k ∈Zk V
ı,n
i,jˆ,kˆ
end for
end for
for j = 0, ..., do
for k = 0, ..., do
for ı = 0, ..., do
V ı,n+1,0j,k = V
ı,n
j,k
end for
end for
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end for
s = 0
while Error > Tol do
for ı = 0, ..., do
Solve
[I +M ı]V ı,n+1,s+1j,k = V¯
ı,n
jˆ,kˆ
+ ∆τH¯j,k(P − ιc) + ∆τΞ(V ı,n+1,sj,k )
end for
Error = maxı
{
maxi
( |V ı,n+1,s+1i,j,k −V ı,n+1,si,j,k |
max
(
1,|V ı,n+1,si,j,k |,|V ı,ni,j,k|
))}
s = s+ 1
end while
end for
end for
end for
Theorem 1. (Convergence of the Fixed Point Iteration) Assuming the following conditions
are satisfied: γıi ≥ 0; βıi ≥ 0; r¯ ≥ 0;λQı ≥ 0, then the fixed point iteration is globally
convergent, and the maximum error at each iteration satisfies
‖ϑs+1‖∞ ≤ ‖ϑs‖∞
∑N
=1
6=ı?
λQı?∆τ
1 + (r¯ +
∑N
=1
 6=ı?
λQı?)∆τ
. (A.24)
Proof. Let ϑı,si,j,k be the error between the exact solution V
ı,n+1
i,j,k and the sth guess V
ı,n+1,s
i,j,k
for the sth iteration. This could be written as
ϑı,si,j,k = V
ı,n+1
i,j,k − V ı,n+1,si,j,k
Use the fixed point iteration above and Equation (A.23), we obtain
[I +M ı]ϑı,s+1j,k = ∆τΞ(ϑ
ı,s
j,k).
in matrix form. For the ith row we have
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[1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
]ϑı,s+1i,j,k
= ∆τγıiϑ
ı,s+1
i−1,j,k + ∆τβ
ı
iϑ
ı,s+1
i+1,j,k + ∆τ
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQıχ(Piξ¯
ı(Pi), ϑ
,s
i∗ ,j,k
, ϑ,si∗+1,j,k)
Let, ‖ϑı,sj,k‖∞ = maxi |ϑı,si,j,k|. Since χ is a linear operator and γıi ≥ 0; βıi ≥ 0;λQı ≥ 0, we get
[1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
]|ϑı,s+1i,j,k |
≤ ∆τγıi‖ϑı,s+1j,k ‖∞ + ∆τβıi‖ϑı,s+1j,k ‖∞ + ∆τ
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı‖ϑ,sj,k‖∞
Let, ‖ϑsj,k‖∞ = maxı ‖ϑı,sj,k‖∞. We can further write
[1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
]|ϑı,s+1i,j,k |
≤ ∆τγıi‖ϑs+1j,k ‖∞ + ∆τβıi‖ϑs+1j,k ‖∞ + ∆τ
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı‖ϑsj,k‖∞
Similarly, let ‖ϑsk‖∞ = maxj ‖ϑsj,k‖∞ and ‖ϑs‖∞ = maxk ‖ϑsk‖∞. We get
[1 + ∆τ
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
]|ϑı,s+1i,j,k |
≤ ∆τγıi‖ϑs+1‖∞ + ∆τβıi‖ϑs+1‖∞ + ∆τ
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı‖ϑs‖∞
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This equation holds for all ı, i, j, k. It is also true for ı?, i?, j?, k? such that |ϑı?,s+1i?,j?,k? | =
‖ϑs+1‖∞. Now,
[1 + ∆τ
(
γı
?
i? + β
ı?
i? + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı?
λQı?)
)
]‖ϑs+1‖∞
≤ ∆τγı?i?‖ϑs+1‖∞ + ∆τβı
?
i?‖ϑs+1‖∞ + ∆τ
N∑
=1
 6=ı?
λQı?‖ϑs‖∞.
This reduces to
‖ϑs+1‖∞ ≤ ‖ϑs‖∞
∑N
=1
 6=ı?
λQı?∆τ
1 + (r¯ +
∑N
=1
6=ı?
λQı?)∆τ
< ‖ϑs‖∞.
A.1.7 Derivation of Equation (A.10) for Interior Prices
We now derive
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = γ
ı
iV
ı,n
i−1,j,k + β
ı
iV
ı,n
i+1,j,k −
(
γıi + β
ı
i + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
Discretize the following equation and apply the second order central differencing in the
first and second order derivative terms.
CV ı =
1
2
(σı)2P 2
∂2V ı
∂P 2
+ [αı(K ı − P )− ΛıσıP ]∂V
ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
Now we have
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(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k =
1
2
(σı)2P 2i
[ V ı,ni+1,j,k−V ı,ni,j,k
Pi+1−Pi −
V ı,ni,j,k−V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi−Pi−1
Pi+1−Pi+Pi−Pi−1
2
]
+[αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi]
V ı,ni+1,j,k − V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi+1 − Pi + Pi − Pi−1 − (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı,n
i,j,k
=
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) −
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1
]
V ı,ni−1,j,k
+
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) +
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1
]
V ı,ni+1,j,k
−
[[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) −
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1
]
+
[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) +
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1
]
+ (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
]
V ı,ni,j,k
= γıi,centralV
ı,n
i−1,j,k + β
ı
i,centralV
ı,n
i+1,j,k − (γıi,central + βıi,central + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı))V
ı,n
i,j,k
if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
where, γıi,central and β
ı
i,central are defined by
γıi,central =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) −
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1
βıi,central =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) +
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi−1 , i = 1, . . . , imax − 1.
If either γıi,central or β
ı
i,central is negative, the discrete scheme will not be monotone. In
this case we need to use first order forward or backward differencing in the first order
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derivative term.
Applying the forward differencing to CV ı, we have
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k =
1
2
(σı)2P 2i
[ V ı,ni+1,j,k−V ı,ni,j,k
Pi+1−Pi −
V ı,ni,j,k−V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi−Pi−1
Pi+1−Pi+Pi−Pi−1
2
]
+[αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi]
V ı,ni+1,j,k − V ı,ni,j,k
Pi+1 − Pi − (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı,n
i,j,k
=
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
]
V ı,ni−1,j,k +
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
+
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi
]
V ı,ni+1,j,k −
[[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
]
+
[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) +
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi
]
+ (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
]
V ı,ni,j,k
= γıi,forwardV
ı,n
i−1,j,k + β
ı
i,forwardV
ı,n
i+1,j,k − (γıi,forward + βıi,forward + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı))V
ı,n
i,j,k
if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
where, γıi,forward and β
ı
i,forward are defined by
γıi,forward =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
βıi,forward =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) +
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi+1 − Pi , i = 1, . . . , imax − 1.
Applying the backward differencing to CV ı, we have
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(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k =
1
2
(σı)2P 2i
[ V ı,ni+1,j,k−V ı,ni,j,k
Pi+1−Pi −
V ı,ni,j,k−V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi−Pi−1
Pi+1−Pi+Pi−Pi−1
2
]
+[αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi]
V ı,ni,j,k − V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi − Pi−1 − (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı,n
i,j,k
=
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) −
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi − Pi−1
]
V ı,ni−1,j,k
+
[
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
]
V ı,ni+1,j,k −
[[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
−α
ı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi − Pi−1
]
+
[ (σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1)
]
+ (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
]
V ı,ni,j,k
= γıi,backwardV
ı,n
i−1,j,k + β
ı
i,backwardV
ı,n
i+1,j,k − (γıi,backward + βıi,backward + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı))V
ı,n
i,j,k
if Pi ∈ (0, Pmax)
where, γıi,backward and β
ı
i,backward are defined by
γıi,backward =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi − Pi−1)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) −
αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi − Pi−1
βıi,backward =
(σı)2P 2i
(Pi+1 − Pi)(Pi+1 − Pi−1) , i = 1, . . . , imax − 1.
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A.1.8 Derivation of Equation (A.10) for the Price at the Lower
Bound
We now derive
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = β
ı
iV
ı,n
i+1,j,k −
(
βıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi = 0
To discretize the following equation, for i = 0 we apply the forward differencing to evaluate
the first order derivative term in C0V
ı.
C0V
ı = αıK ı
∂V ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
We get
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = α
ıK ı
V ı,ni+1,j,k − V ı,ni,j,k
Pi+1 − Pi − (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı,n
i,j,k
=
αıK ı
Pi+1 − PiV
ı,n
i+1,j,k −
[ αıK ı
Pi+1 − Pi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)
]
V ı,ni,j,k
= βı0V
ı,n
i+1,j,k − (βı0 + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı))V
ı,n
i,j,k if Pi = 0
where, γı0 and β
ı
0 are defined by
γı0 = 0.
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βı0 =
αıK ı
P1 − P0 .
A.1.9 Derivation of Equation (A.10) for the Price at the Upper
Bound
We now derive
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = γ
ı
iV
ı,n
i−1,j,k −
(
γıi + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
)
V ı,ni,j,k if Pi = P
max
To discretize the following equation, for i = imax we apply the backward differencing to
evaluate the first order derivative term in C1V
ı.
C1V
ı = [αı(K ı − P )− ΛıσıP ]∂V
ı
∂P
− (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)V
ı.
We obtain
(CεV )
ı,n
i,j,k = [α
ı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi]
V ı,ni,j,k − V ı,ni−1,j,k
Pi − Pi−1 − (r¯ +
N∑
=1
6=ı
λQı)V
ı,n
i,j,k
=
[− αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi − Pi−1
]
V ı,ni−1,j,k −
[− αı(K ı − Pi)− ΛıσıPi
Pi − Pi−1 + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı)
]
V ı,ni,j,k
= γıimaxV
ı,n
i−1,j,k − (γıimax + (r¯ +
N∑
=1
 6=ı
λQı))V
ı,n
i,j,k if Pi = P
max
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where, γıimax and β
ı
imax are defined by
γıimax = −
αı(K ı − Pimax)− ΛıσıPimax
Pimax − Pimax−1
.
βıimax = 0.
A.2 Tables for the Sensitivity Analyses
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Table A.1: Numerical Results with Different Mean Reverting Rate
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1282900 1278600 1271400 1258800 1233000
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -1.9 -3.9
FF Profit 1281700 1276400 1267300 1240400 1184000
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -3.2 -7.6
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1310000 1304800 1296400 1281000 1254000
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.0 -2.2 -4.3
FF Profit 1312900 1307700 1299000 1273400 1220000
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -3.0 -7.1
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1398200 1391000 1379500 1353800 1319100
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.2 -5.7
FF Profit 1412300 1407400 1399000 1373900 1329500
%ch N/A -0.4 -0.9 -2.7 -5.9
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.2: Numerical Results with Different Transition Probabilities
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1434100 1427400 1416900 1394100 1357400
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -2.8 -5.4
FF Profit 1432700 1424700 1411700 1371000 1296200
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.3 -9.5
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1471000 1463500 1451900 1426100 1387800
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.1 -5.7
FF Profit 1473400 1465800 1453600 1416000 1346800
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.9 -8.6
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1602100 1592700 1578200 1540400 1491500
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -3.9 -6.9
FF Profit 1614000 1606800 1595500 1563400 1514600
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -3.1 -6.2
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.3: Numerical Results with Different Volatilities
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1444500 1437900 1427400 1405900 1370700
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -2.7 -5.1
FF Profit 1443100 1435200 1422100 1382600 1308900
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.5 -4.2 -9.3
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1491500 1484100 1472600 1447300 1408800
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.0 -5.6
FF Profit 1494000 1486400 1474200 1437600 1370700
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.8 -8.3
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1641500 1632400 1618100 1580500 1531000
%ch N/A -0.6 -1.4 -3.7 -6.7
FF Profit 1653100 1646300 1635800 1608600 1565400
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.7 -5.3
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.4: Numerical Results with Different Base Regime Mean
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 353240 349390 344550 335130 325670
%ch N/A -1.1 -2.5 -5.1 -7.8
FF Profit 354010 350210 345400 333960 327760
%ch N/A -1.1 -2.4 -5.7 -7.4
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 403830 399100 392940 378800 364600
%ch N/A -1.2 -2.7 -6.2 -9.7
FF Profit 409700 405900 401180 390370 386960
%ch N/A -0.9 -2.1 -4.7 -5.6
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 540470 533690 524440 497970 470150
%ch N/A -1.3 -3.0 -7.9 -13.0
FF Profit 557720 554080 549920 542920 542270
%ch N/A -0.7 -1.4 -2.7 -2.8
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.5: Numerical Results with Different Production Cost
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 1 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1794800 1790600 1782100 1765500 1729300
%ch N/A -0.2 -0.7 -1.6 -3.7
FF Profit 1793400 1787700 1776500 1738400 1657900
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -3.1 -7.6
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1826200 1821200 1811700 1792600 1755700
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -1.8 -3.9
FF Profit 1828500 1823200 1812800 1778000 1702600
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -2.8 -6.9
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit in Regime 2 at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 160 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1939800 1932900 1920600 1890600 1846000
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.0 -2.5 -4.8
FF Profit 1951500 1946600 1937200 1908200 1852800
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.7 -2.2 -5.1
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.6: Summary of Results from the Sensitivity Analysis
Base Regime
Case Power Plant Value Ramping Impact on Power Plant Value
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (Benchmark) N/A N/A
η=0.72, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (I) Lower (?) Smaller (?)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.02, λ
Q
21=0.7402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (II) Higher (?) Larger (?)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.93, σ2=1.43, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (III) Higher (?) Larger (?)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=27.194,
c=20 (IV) Lower (?) Larger (?) (Most Cases)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=10 (V) Higher (?) Smaller (?)
Spike Regime
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (Benchmark) N/A N/A
η=0.72, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (I) Lower (∗) Smaller (∗) (Most Cases)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.02, λ
Q
21=0.7402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (II) Higher (∗) Larger (∗)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.93, σ2=1.43, µ1=47.194,
c=20 (III) Higher (∗) Larger (∗)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=27.194,
c=20 (IV) Lower (∗) Larger (∗) (Most Cases)
η=0.36, λQ12=0.0089, λ
Q
21=0.8402,
σ1=0.73485, σ2=0.83066, µ1=47.194,
c=10 (V) Higher (∗) Smaller (∗)
Note: ? and ∗ mean comparing to the benchmark for the base regime and spike regime respectively.
Other benchmark parameter values are given in Table 3.3 and the corresponding results are reported in
Table 3.4.
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Table A.7: Base Regime as Single Regime for the Regime Switching Model
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1329400 1325700 1318800 1307700 1282800
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -1.6 -3.5
FF Profit 1328100 1323300 1314200 1286700 1228700
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -3.1 -7.5
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1363900 1359500 1351700 1338900 1315300
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -1.8 -3.6
FF Profit 1366100 1361900 1354300 1334700 1284400
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -2.3 -6.0
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
Table A.8: Base Regime as Single Regime for the Regime Switching Model with Different
Mean Reverting Rate
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1249800 1246900 1241300 1233100 1210400
%ch N/A -0.2 -0.7 -1.3 -3.2
FF Profit 1248600 1244800 1237400 1215300 1163200
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.9 -2.7 -6.8
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1267900 1264500 1258100 1249000 1227100
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -1.5 -3.2
FF Profit 1270500 1267200 1260800 1242200 1192400
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -2.2 -6.2
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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Table A.9: Base Regime as Single Regime for the Regime Switching Model with Different
Volatilities
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1379900 1374400 1365500 1351100 1324200
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.0 -2.1 -4.0
FF Profit 1378500 1371800 1360500 1329000 1267400
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.3 -3.6 -8.1
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1414700 1408400 1398500 1382500 1357000
%ch N/A -0.5 -1.2 -2.3 -4.1
FF Profit 1416700 1410600 1400900 1377400 1323600
%ch N/A -0.4 -1.1 -2.8 -6.6
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
Table A.10: Base Regime as Single Regime for the Regime Switching Model with Different
Production Cost
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 40 EUR/MWh
Case No Ramping
Restrictions
5000 (CFS-hr) 3000 (CFS-hr) 1000 (CFS-hr) 250 (CFS-hr)
HF Profit 1755700 1752800 1746000 1733900 1701600
%ch N/A -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 -3.1
FF Profit 1754300 1750000 1740600 1707700 1632600
%ch N/A -0.3 -0.8 -2.7 -6.9
Total Profit and Change of Total Profit at Time 0 When the Initial Price is 80 EUR/MWh
HF Profit 1789100 1785500 1777800 1764600 1734100
%ch N/A -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -3.1
FF Profit 1791000 1787500 1779800 1755700 1688300
%ch N/A -0.2 -0.6 -2.0 -5.7
Note: HF means half release rate and full reservoir level; FF means full release rate and full reservoir
level. Profit is in Euros and %ch refers to the percent change in profits compared to the case of no
ramping restrictions.
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